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That you were gone, not to return again
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And such a street (so are the papers filled)
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—
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCnON

Few events interrupt our lives with as mich dramatic intensity
and emotional upheaval as the death of a loved person.
several iitimediately discernible reasons for this.

There are

First, the process

of bereavement often unleashes a barrage of strong emotionsdepression, desolation, loneliness, fear, anger, bitterness, guilt,

and despair among them—which, in their potency and pervasive
influence, may be unlike any emotions the bereaved person has

previously experienced.

Second, the death often dictates very real

changes in the person's life.

It may result in the severing of old

patterns and behaviors, the forced adoption of new skills or
responsibilities, the rearrangement of family structure, or

alterations in financial status.

And third, particularly if it is

unejqDected or if the deceased is a young person, v^ose death seems

out of keeping with the "natural" order of things, the death may call
into question some of the most basic beliefs and assuitptions that

guide the bereaved person's life.

These may include deeply (and

often tacitly) held beliefs about religion, fate, the benevolence of

the world, the safety of the world, the meaning or purpose of life,
and the degree to v^iich one is in control of one's own destiny.

There is little disagreement with the notion that bereavement

can cause profound changes in a person's life.

The psychological

literature of the past 25 years pertaining to grief has attempted to

describe (e.g. Click, Weiss & Parkes, 1974; Parkes, 1986) as well as
1

.

operationalize (Sanders, Mauger, & Strong, 1979; W.
Stroebe &
Stroebe, 1987; Zisook, Devaul, & Click, 1982) the
grieving process.

A wealth of studies have focussed on the effects of bereavement
on
mortality and health (cf
W. Stroebe & Stroebe,

.

M. Stroebe, Stroebe, Gergen & Gergen,

1987)

.

1981;

Also found in the literature are

attempts to delineate "normal" grief from "pathological" grief,
to

distinguish the effects of a sudden death from those of an illness
(e.g. Ball,

1983)

,

1977; Click et al, 1974; Lundin, 1984; Sanders, 1982-

to establish a suitable timeline for a grieving process, and

to identify stages or milestones in the passage from acute grief to
recovery (e.g. Kubler-Ross, 1969; Spiegel, 1977; Zisook

& Devaul,

1985)

However, amid this plethora of studies examining bereavement's

effects on behavior, emotion, psychological state, and health, what
is missing is a systematic exploration of the

effects of bereavement

on an individual's network of beliefs and assumptions about life.
These changes in attitude appear to be axiomatical ly accepted in the
descriptions of more overt indications of change, but rarely become

the object of scrutiny in themselves.
For example, in the Harvard Bereavement Project (Click, Weiss,
Parkes, 1974)

,

a general goal of the study was "to describe in a

systematic way the experience of grieving and the processes by
individuals recover from grief"

(p.

3)

.

Yet even in this

conprehensive landmark investigation, there was no attenpt to
e^qjlore, and minimal data regarding,

subjects' assunptions about life.

2

vytiat

had changed in the

v\tiich

&

The present study is an exploration of the "assumptive
worlds"
of bereaved irdividuals.
reasons.

my

The study was undertaken for several

First, as this is largely uncharted territory, the
findings

be of benefit in helping to fontiulate more ejqjansive notions
of

vAiat

grief is and how pervasive its effects are, particularly in the

realm of cognitive changes.

Second, an understanding of how one's

assumptive world changes due to bereavement can be related to vhat is

already established regarding the effects of other traumas and major
life events on assunptive beliefs.

For example, there is support for

the hypothesis that the experience of a negative trauma alters the
victim's belief system (Janoff-Bulman, 1985; Janoff-Bulman
1983)

.

& Frieze,

Bereavement, in this regard, may be considered one of a

subset of events that call into question fundamental beliefs.

Third,

it may be that detecting differences in the belief systems of

bereaved individuals

—and

the changes that the bereavement has

wrouc^t i:^n the belief systems

—can help

e5q)lain some unclarified

issues about grief, such as v^y some individuals grieve

"pathologically" and others grieve "normally," or vhy

grief may be

short-lived for some individuals and protracted for others.

(As an

example, it may be that individuals v^o believe that people "get what

they deserve" in life will ej^jerience more difficulty in reconciling

the death of a loved one than do individuals vho believe in the
caprice of fate.)

And fourth, assuming that insist is at least one

tool in facilitating change, an understanding of how bereavement has

affected one's assunptive world may have therapeutic ramifications.

3

providing a different template for understanding some of
the
conflict, pain and confusion that are part of grief.

4

CHAPTER II
THEORIES OF GRIEF:

AN OVERVIEW

Primarily for the ideas detailed in 'Tyiouming and Melancholia,"
Siginund Freud (1917)

is credited with the first psychologically-based

systematic theory of grief.

Freud thought that grieving was the

process by v*iich the energy vdiich connected the lost object to the

bereaved person was gradually withdrawn, or decathected.
labelled the process "hypercathexis."

Freud

To accornplish the process,

bereaved individuals turn their back on the world and undergo an
emotional review of the person's life.

Grief is successfully worked

through v^en the individual has decathected the energy from the

deceased person and hence can return to society and establish new
bonds with people.

John Bowlby's (1961) ideas about grief are grounded in
psychoanalytic thought but also were strongly influenced by the
fields of ethology, neurophysiology, and information theory, as well

as his observations of separation and loss in childhood.

Bowlby's

theory is based on the inportance of attachment for survival in
infants and young animals.

He posits that the process of grieving is

similar to earlier ej^riences with loss and consists of three
stages:

protest, despair and detachment.

The protest stage consists

of behaviors that are designed (Bowlby suggests they are triggered
biochemically) to bring back the lost object.

—both of

include crying and anger

vydiich

an infant learns as effective

behaviors in retrieving the desired mother.

5

These behaviors

The despair stage.

during v^ich the infant (or bereaved individual)
realizes that
protest has been ineffectual in bringing back the
desired object, is
characterized by pain and the disorganization of one's set
of
expectations and assuiiptions about the environment.

Although it is

disorganizing, it is reality-based (in the case of bereavement)

,

for

it is a process of adjustment to the irrevocability of
the loss.

The

final stage, detachment, signals an acceptance of the loss and
the

resolution of grief.
Bowlby (1969) believes that an integral part of human perception

and cognition is a "working model of the world," v^iich serves to make
sense of the world.

The model is active and is constantly subjected

to modification based on experience.

The despair stage of grieving

can be thought of as the resulting inadequacy of the individual's
working model to help him or her explain the permanence of the loss.
In the view of Parkes (1971, 1988)

,

grief is the gradual process

of internal reification of an event that has already happened in
external reality.
time.

These modifications of the internal world take

The pain and frustration of grief is caused, at least in part,

by the discrepancies between the external world and internal
representations which have not yet changed accordingly.

Parkes

(1988) suggests that bereavement is one of a class of events, which

he labels "psychosocial transitions," that cause upheaval in one's
These are major life transitions

life and one's assumptive world.

v^ich "require people to undertake a major revision of their
assuroptions about the world; are lasting in their implications rather

6

.

than transient; and take place

cfver

a relatively short pericxi of time

so that there is little opportunity for preparation"

(p.

55)

Parkes does not feel, however, that psychosocial
transitions

alone can accoiont for the existence and intensity of
grief.

He

believes that Bowlby's attachinent theory is also a key element
in
grieving, although he has not specified the relationship or

interaction between his ideas and those of Bowlby.

Approaching grief from a different perspective, Wortman and

Silver (1987; in press) argue that many of the central tenets of

widely accepted theories of grief lack empirical validity.
Specifically, they suggest that five key assumptions of dealing with

a loss are not substantiated by the data.

These assuirptions are:

distress or depression is an inevitable consequence of loss;
failure to ej^)erience distress is indicative of pathology;

1)

2)

3)

a loss

must be "worked through" in order to come to a successful resolution;
4)

there is an expectation of "recovery" from the loss; and

5)

this

recovery is understood as reaching a state of resolution regarding

the loss.l
In their review of the literature on bereavement and sudden
physical disability, Wortman and Silver suggest that these "myths of

In the earlier (1987) presentation of their argument, Wortman
and Silver included two additional assuirptions they found
unwarranted: 1) positive emotions are absent in grief; and 2) it is
necessary to break down attachments to the lost object as part of
dealing with the loss. Their challenge to these assuitptions is
bolsetered by enpirical support, i.e. a lack of eirpirical
substantiation for the assuirptions. However, these two points are
neither addressed nor incorporated into the more recent presentation
of their argument.
7

.

coping" do not adequately match the reality of personal
ejqjerience.

They argue that although these assumptions are unwarranted,
they are
deeply ingrained in cultural stereotypes and in the theoretical
biases of researchers and mental health providers.

The perpetuation

of these myths does a disservice to bereaved individuals, in that

they provide an inadequate or incanplete template for understanding
grief.

In addition, by focusing on the notion of a "correct" path to

complete resolution, attention is diverted from other potentially
iitportant aspects of loss:

"In our judgment, an unfortunate

consequence of the pervasive belief in recovery from loss is that
attention has been deflected away from examining the possible

mechanisms through which loss may produce subsequent and continued
mental or physical health problems" (in press; p. 20)

The authors suggest that a more empirically and clinically valid
approach to understanding grief involves acknowledging the

possibility of three potential grieving styles:
from

hi^

pattern)

;

individuals v^o move

to low distress over time (i.e., the traditional, expected
individuals who do not show distress, either in immediate

reaction to the loss or subsequently; and individuals

hi^

\A\o

remain in a

state of distress for a longer period of time than current

theories of grief label appropriate.
In their conclusion, Wortman and Silver tacitly acknowledge that

they allow for the possibility of pathological grieving.

However,

they do not discuss in their proposed model how a pathological
response would be identified given the various styles discussed.

While this remains an unresolved and awkward result of their central

8

thesis, their argument is nonetheless valid
and important in calling

into question some of the most influential assumptions
that guide the

understanding of bereavement in our culture.

9

CHAPTER III

A FEW PARAMETERS OF

GRIEF:

A REVIEW OF THE UTERATORE

There are four relevant aspects of grief vdiich, vAiile
not all

directly related to the present study, are discussed because
together
they begin to

fom

bereavement.

These four topics are:

an integrated fabric of what is entailed in
the length of grief, normal vs.

pathological grief, how grief is affected by the type of death, and

the role of social support in facilitating successful resolution of
grief.

Length of Grief

There is no agreement among various authors about
constitutes the proper period for normal grief.

vdiat

Conservative

estimates cillow four to six weeks for normal grieving (Linderaann,
1944)

;

however, recent findings (e.g. Lehman, Wortman, & Williams,

1987; lundin, 1984; Zisook, DeVaul, & Click, Jr., 1982), suggest that

grief

mi^t be

a much longer, and perhaps indefinitely long, process.

Lindemann (1944) interviewed 101 survivors of the Coconut Grove
fire in Boston.

His findings are regarded as an iitportant

description of "acute" grief, accounting for both the emotional and
somatic reactions typical of recent bereavement.

After four to six

weeks, Lindemann found, these pronounced syirptoms were in abeyance,

leading him to conclude that grief was a relatively brief

psychological event.

10

In contrast, Lehman, Wortman and Williams
(1987) interviewed 80
subjects v^ose spouse or child had died suddenly in
a car accident

four to seven years previously.

The bereaved spouses and parents

were significantly more depressed than matched controls (as
measured

by the Hopkins Symptom Checklist)

;

the bereaved spouses also measured

significantly lower on measures of social functioning, psychological
well-being, reactivity to good events, and future worries and
concerns.

Further, the majority of the bereaved (68% of spouses, 59%

of parents) reported that they had never made any sense of the death

or found any meaning in

it.

Of the many respondents (85% of spouses

and 91% of parents) v^o had asked themselves "Why me?" or "Why
spouse/child)?,"

(ray

the majority (59% of each category) had not been

able to find an answer.

Both Lundin (1984) and Zisook, DeVaul and Click, Jr.

(1982) used

the Texas Grief Inventory (Faschingbauer, DeVaul, & Zisook, 1977;
Zisook, et al., 1982) to measure the extent to v*iich a bereaved

person was still grieving for a person
before.
v*io

viho

had died several years

Lundin corpared 130 first-degree relatives of individuals

had died suddenly with first-degree relatives of individuals

vdiose death had been expected.

The subjects and controls had both

been bereaved eight years previously.

Lundin found significantly

higher levels of grief among the sudden death group than among the
expected death controls.

The study, however, does not include any

measures of functioning or psychological state to correlate with the
Texas Grief Inventory.

As there are no normative data for the Texas

Grief Inventory, it is difficult to make statements about the degree

11

.

of grief after

ei^t

years, other than comparisons between the
two

groups.
Zisook, et al.

(1982) administered the Texas Grief Inventory to

211 subjects who had been bereaved from between one month
and 12

years prior to the time of the study.

They found that the acute

dysphoria of grief peaked within one to two years after bereavement,

but that even after 10 years, several items of the inventory were
still strongly endorsed (e.g. "At times I still feel the need to cry
for the person v^o died," or "Even now it's painful to recall

memories of the person

v*io

died")

In short, the primary trend in the literature has been a
lengthening of the time thou^t to be appropriate for "normal" grief.

This pattern is represented in the difference between Lindemann's
1944 assessment and the current tendency towards viewing grief as a

more open- ended process.

While the more dramatic and dysphoric

syirptoms of grief may reach their peak in the first two years, the

residual effects may have a very long-term influence on the bereaved
person.

Related to this, there has been a growing wariness of stage

models of grief (e.g. that of Kubler-Ross, 1969).
(1982)

Zisook, et al.

found that grief can be manifested in an array of behaviors

and emotions.

Parkes (1986) states:

"Grief is not a set of syitptoms

v^ich start after a loss and then gradually fade away.

It involves a

succession of clinical pictures v*iich blend into and replace one
another"

(p. 27).

In addition, the pattern of grieving is influenced

by factors such as sudden vs. expected death, the age of the

12
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deceased, and most likely a host of other cultural
and personal

variables (e.g. Click, et al., 1974; Sanders,
1982-83).

What is

emerging is a construct of grief v*iich is complex,
imilti-dimensional,
and, at least to some degree, idiosyncratic.

Pathological vs. Non-mtholoaical Grief

Given the above-mentioned inability to delineate

v*iat

constitutes a normal grieving process, both in terms of length and
in

how it is manifested, it is not surprising that drawing a line
between pathological and non-pathological grief is difficult to do.
Zisook and DeVaul (1985) state:
.our studies have suggested that unresolved grief is a
Most, if not all, people
never totally resolve their grief; significant aspects of the
bereavement process go on for years after the loss, even in
otherwise normal patients. .It is unclear at v*iat point and to
vAiat degree these behaviors and symptoms become medical or
psychiatric concerns and become pathological or predispose to
serious medical, psychological, or social conplications (p. 377).
. .

somevAiat overly siirplistic concept.

.

This is in contrast to Parkes and Weiss (1983)

term follow

\jp

,

v^o, in a long-

to the Harvard Bereavement Study (Glick, et al., 1974)

identify three patterns of chronic grief in widows:

unexpected-grief

syndrome, ambivalent-grief syndrome, and chronic-grief syndrome.

The

first syndrome results from an unexpected death; the other two result

from interpersonal dynamics in the relationship with the deceased
spouse (ambivalent grief from an ambivalent relationship, and chronic

grief from a relationship in vdiich one member, either the survivor or
the deceased, was strongly dependent

13

i^n

the other)

.

Cowan and Murphy (1985)

,

while avoiding the concept of

pathological vs. non-pathological grief, attempted to
isolate

variables that influenced a positive outcome of bereavement.
Subjects were 69 individuals who had been bereaved as
a result of the
Mt. St. Helens volcanic eruption in 1980.

individuals served as a control group,

Fifty matched non-bereaved

ihe variables studied were

gender, age, concurrent life stress, social support, self-reported

centrality or peripherality of the deceased to the bereaved person,

and perception of the death as preventable or unpreventable.

Outcome

measures were depression, somatization and physical health status (as

measured by the Hopkins Symptom Checklist and a six-item physical
health index)

.

The six selected variables, v^en analyzed with a

hierarchical step-wise regression, accounted for 48% of the variance
in predicting depression, 39% in predicting somatization and 35% in

predicting physical health status.

Concurrent life stress (as

measured by the Life ED^jeriences Survey) was the most significant
predictor for all three outcomes.

Effects of Type of Death

The majority of studies contrasting the effects of long-term vs.
sudden death suggest that sudden death has both longer lasting and
immediately more deleterious effects (e.g. Ball, 1977; Click, et al.,
1974; Dundin, 1984; Parkes & Weiss, 1983;

W. Stroebe & Stroebe,

1987)

As one exception, Sanders (1982-83) looked at 86 bereaved
individuals shortly after bereavement and at an 18 month follow-up.

14

She divided her subjects into three groi^:

sudden death, short-term

chronic illness (defined as less than six months)

chronic illness.

,

and long-term

Using the Grief Experience Inventory (Sanders,

Mauger & Strong, 1979) and the Minnesota Multiphasic Pfersonality
Inventory, she did not find group differences in the overall
number

of symptoms or extent of grief reported, but did find differences
in
the types of symptoms reported.

At the 18 month follow-up, the

sudden death groi^ showed greater anger, guilt, depersonalization,

somatization and physical synptoms than the other groups; the long-

term chronic group showed the most social isolation, rumination,
denial and loss of emotional control.
Sanders' study hints at v*iat are likely important variables to

consider in assessing the effects of various types of death.
exairple,

For

in a long-term illness a spouse may spend a great deal of

his or her time in the role of caretaker.

Once the person dies, the

survivor may be deprived not only of his or her mate, but also of
v*iat

had become the primary role that gave meaning to his or her

life.

Lindemann (1944) first suggested the relative benefit of
"anticipatory grief" in predisposing bereaved individuals to a

positive outcome.

Click et al.

(1974) concur that advanced warning

of death predisposes the mourner towarxJs a less-troubled resolution
of grief; however, they pointedly reject the notion of anticipatory
grief.

From the results of their extensive interviews with 49 widows

and 19 widowers, they conclude:
...the iiipact on survivors of a long-forewarned death is quite
different from the impact of a totally uneoqsected death. The
15
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ijy in v^iich they differ is not that anticipation
has permitted
the eventual survivor to begin to reorganize himself
or herself
both cognitively and emotionally so that the loss,
when it
comes, is already partially grieved for.
If this were the case
anticipated grief and unanticipated grief would follow the
same'
course, thou<^ anticipated grief would begin it earlier.
This
is not v*iat happens. The grief that follows unanticipated
bereavement is different in both form and duration from the
grief that has been anticipated (p. 14; underlining original
authors')

There are several complications in fully interpreting the
literature on "no-warning" vs. "advance-warning" bereavement.

First,

few studies control, a priori, for age of the deceased person, age of

the bereaved person, and the relationship between the deceased and
the bereaved.

Second, it is unclear that a bi-polar structure is

most appropriate.

Most studies (e.g. Click et al, 1974; Lundin,

1984) define sudden death as no advance warning, thereby categorizing

a few days' warning (or, in Lundin's case, a few hours' warning) with

illnesses of lengthy duration.

Sanders' study, with its tri-partite

structure, appears to be a more sensible structural categorization of

periods of warning.

Role of Social Support in Bereavement

There are anple data showing that social support can be an
important factor in enabling a person to recover from a traumatic
incident.

For exaitple, Pennebaker and O'Heeron (1984) found that

spouses of suicide and accident victims

v4io

confided in others and

talked about the trauma reported a significantly lower illness rate

than those

v*io

did not talk about it.

Pennebaker (e.g., 1987)

hypothesizes that the there is an inhibition-disease connection,
vAiereby "the act of inhibiting or otherwise restraining ongoing

16
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behavior, thoughts and feelings requires
physiological work" (p.781)

The assumption with bereavement is that not
talking about the
emotions and thoughts connected with the death
represents inhibition.

As previously discussed, Cowan and Murphy
(1985) use perceived
social support as one of six predictor variables
in determining the

psychological and somatic correlates of grieving.

Their results

indicate that it is significantly correlated with depression,
but not

with somatization or general health concerns.
Lehman, Ellard and Wortman (1986) attempted to operationalize

social support for bereaved individuals by separating it into

constituent components (e.g., "contact with similar others," "provide

opportunity to discuss feelings," and "give advice")

.

Using the same

subjects discussed in the Lehman, Wortman and Williams (1987) long-

term bereavement study, they asked subjects to list, retrospectively,
v4iat

had been helpful and unhelpful to them in terms of social

support.

Subjects could endorse as many items as they wished.

The

types of social support that were perceived as most helpful were

having contact with a similar other, the opportunity to ventilate,
and eoqDressions of concern.

The types of support that were perceived

as most unhelpful were v*ien people encouraged recovery, gave advice,

or made rude remarks or acted rudely.

17

CHAPIER IV

ASSUMPTIVE WORID BELIEFS:

A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

As With Bcfwlby's (1969) previously discussed notion
that
individuals fomulate a "working model of the world" to
make sense of

both internal and external data, several theorists have
postulated
the existence of an "assumptive world" that guides thoughts,
behaviors and emotions.

Common to these theories is the

conceptualization of the assumptive world as an active filter,

allowing for varying interpretations of the same objective phenomena
so that they are most concordant with the internal belief system.

In

most cases, the assumptions are thought to be operating at a level
outside of or beyond the individual's awareness.

be discussed:

Four theorists will

George Kelly, Melvin Lemer, Seymour Epstein and

Ronnie Janoff-Bulman.

Georrre Kelly

According to personal construct theory (1955)

,

individuals

conduct their lives much like scientists conduct experiments:
engage in a constant testing of hypotheses.

both

The scientist tests

hypotheses to confirm or negate a theoretical model, and individuals

test hypotheses to maintain or alter their conceptions of, and
expectations about, reality.

Events in the objective world are

construed in such a way as to make the most sense with pre-existing
assumptions.

According to this approach, v^ich was of seminal

importance in the development of cognitive-based schools

18

.

of psychotherapy, "a person's processes are
psychologically
channelized by the ways in which he anticipates events"
(1963, p.io)

Kelly posits three stages to the process of
approaching the

of day to day living:

cJata

circumspection, preemption and choice.

Information is interpreted to be congruent with a larger
model, or

set of assumptions, the individual has about him
/ herself and the
world.

This internal model (or theory) is pervasive in its

influence:

—

—

a theory, then scientific or personal ou^t to cover a lot of
situations, to be fertile with coherent practical suggestions
about v*iat one might do in those situations, to be a reasonable
approximation to the truth—serving the person at his present
stage of development, and it should always lead to constructive
ejqjerimentation and revision (1963, p. 24).
For Kelly, change is brou(^t about by transferring the
assumptive bases by vdiich an individual construes reality to the
conscious inspection and direction of the individual.

Melvin Lemer
According to Lemer 's (1980) "just world" hypothesis, people
operate on an assumptive (and moral) level as if there were a causal

connection between peoples' character and
life; in other words, people get

v^t

vdiat

happens to them in

they deserve.

There is a need

to explain events in terms that are the most sensible, or most
consistent with a simple cause and effect model; hence, if you are a
"good" person, good things will happen to you, and if you are a "bad"
person, then bad things will happen to you.

Because of the causal

relationship posited between character and action, the belief in a

just world is a powerful tool in "blaming the victim" for an act that
19

mi<^t otherwise be viewed as random.

For example, people might

believe that a woman v^o is raped is "scanehow asking for
it," or a

person with AIDS "somehow deserves" to be so afflic±ed.

The just world hypothesis implies that in the case of an
unej^jected or untimely death of a loved one, a bereaved person
will

face an "assumptive dilemma."

In other words, if an individual

tacitly believes in a just world, he or she will then have to
relinquish that belief, or struggle to maintain it in the face of

disconfirming evidence.

Seymour Epstein
Epstein (1980) postulates an assunptive world in which the
iirportance of the self-concept is introduced as one of the

significant sets of assumptions that enable an individual to construe
reality.

Each individual creates a personal theory of reality,

guiding not only how he or she behaves, but also how he or she thinks

and feels.

The individual theory "determines how a person

selectively attends to experience, encodes it into schemas, and
files, organizes and selectively retrieves the schemas in a manner

that facilitates coping with reality" (1986, p.l).
There are three main goals of the personal reality theory:

"to

maintain a favorable pleasure-pain balance over the anticipated
future, to assimilate the data of reality into a cohesive, relatively

stable conceptual system, and to maintain a favorable level of selfesteem.

Behavior is normally a conpromise between these three

functions" (1986, p. 1-2)

.

A crucial point is that these three goals
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are interrelated and an effect on one will
necessitate changes in the
others.

Thus, events which jar one's assumptions about
reality, such

as bereavement, may also impinge on one's self-worth.

Epstein posits that, related to the three goals of
personal
reality theory, individuals have two primary systems for
selfknowledge:

an experiential conceptual system and a rational

conceptual system.

The two are related, but Epstein stresses their

independence more than their commonality; thus, it is possible to

know something on a rational level (e.g., that airplane travel is
statistically safer than automobile travel) but believe otherwise on

an experiential level (i.e., the same person

airplane but not in an automobile)

.

mi^t

fear riding in an

Thus, Epstein believes that a

purely cognitive approach to facilitating change is incorrplete.

The

experiential conceptual system—the "deeper" and more primtive of

the two

—needs

to be addressed emotionally and ejqjerientially rather

than cerebrally.
Epstein's theory suggests several important iiiplications for
bereavement.

First, in the broadest sense, an unexpected death

(either because it is sudden or because it is "age-inappropriate")

will likely severely strain one's theory of reality, since it so

strongly affects tacit beliefs about the orderliness and sensibility

of life.

Second, because the various goals of the personal reality

theory are inextricably intertwined, one would expect such a dramatic
change in assuirptions in reality to be reflected in an individual's
level of self-worth.

Third, the hypothesized existence of two

independent conceptual systems lends itself to a theory of grief,
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.

simlar to the Barkes

(1988) position already discussed.

Grief might

be thought of as the gradual ej^iential
learning of knowledge which
the rational system can inore quickly grasp,
and the restructuring of
one's personal theory of reality v*iich is
necessitated by the real

changes in the external world.

(One implication here is that the

individual's assumptive world is lodged at a deep
level, and hence to

disturb it requires

ej^iential, rather than rational, learning)

Ronnie Janoff-Bulman
In order to e>q)lain the common responses of trauma victims
across a wide range of events (e.g. rape, incest, criminal assault,
natural disaster), Janoff-Bulman (1985; Janoff-Bulman & Frieze,
1983)

has hypothesized that the shared link in various posttraumatic stress
reactions is the need to reconstitute the basic, implicit assumptions

an individual holds about him or herself and the world which have
been shattered by the traumatic event.
Janoff-Bulman 's (in press) model of the assumptive world
contains three categories of basic assumptions by vliich an individual

construes reality:

the benevolence of the world, the meaningfulness

of the world, and the individual's self-worth or self-esteem.

These

three categories of assunptions are subdivided and represented by

ei^t more

specific systems of belief:

the benevolence of the world

and of people; the belief in a just world; the belief that people, in
general, can have control over their world by engaging in the proper

behaviors; the belief that the world is "random"

—

i.e. that good and

bad events are distributed by chance; the belief that one is a good

22

and worthy person; the belief that "I" (not people
in general) can
control the outcome of life events by engaging in the
proper
behaviors; and the belief that one is a lucky person.

These systems of beliefs can combine in many different ways.
For example, an individual might believe that the world is
malicious
and random, but that he or she is a deserving and lucky person.

Or,

a person might believe that the world is just, and that he or she
is

not worthy and so deserves \4iatever he or she gets.
It can be seen that there are parallels between Janoff-Bulman's

three main categories of assumptions and Epstein's three goals of a
personal theory of reality

(a

positive pleasure-pain balance, a need

to form a cohesive picture of reality, and self-worth)

.

The models

differ in that in Janoff-Bulman's work, the enphasis is on the
specific content of the assunptions, and how the content of these
assuirptions are affected v^en an individual is faced with an

unexpected trauma.
Janoff-Bulman's "World Assunptions Scale" (in press) is designed

to assess the degree to vy^ich individuals subscribe to the various
beliefs described above. In a sanple of 338 college undergraduates,
83 reported that they had experienced one or more of the following

traumatic events:

death of a parent, death of a sibling, incest,

rape, fire that destroyed their home, and an accident resulting in a

serious disability.

Three of the assunptions significantly

distinguished the "victim" from the "non-victim" group:

perceived

self-worth, chance as a distributional principle for making sense of
the world, and the benevolence of the world.
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The single best

.

predictor of victimized status was lower self-^orth
(Janoff-Bulman,
in press)

Synopsis
Several key points emerge from this brief review of the

assunptive world.
First, our assuitptions constitute a conoplex and multi-

dimensional network of beliefs, involving both a view of reality
and
a view of the self, by which individuals make sense of the world

around them and their place in it.
Second, these assunptions usually operate at a level outside of

awareness, but nonetheless exert a great deal of influence over

decisions that are made and emotions and attitudes that are perceived

or felt.

A dramatic change in one's environment, totally incongruent

with one's belief system, may force a conscious examination of the
assumptions; on the other hand, the belief system may instead be

resilient enough that it will remain unchanged, and hence dictate

changes in the perception of reality.
Third, the "perceiver" and the perceived are inextricably

united; in other words, one's beliefs about oneself are integrally

tied to one's beliefs about the world.

And fourth, an individual's assunptive world is extremely
resistant to change.

It operates on a deep intrapsychic level and

may be inseparable from a core sense of self.

(On a related note, it

is to this point that Edna St. Vincent Millay so eloquently speaks in

the sonnet v^ich introduces this paper.
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How much easier

—and

how

fervent the desire-to ignore traumatic events
vAiich disnipt our
lives, to sijtply "read with greater care
where to store furs, and how

to treat the hair.")
It should be noted that v*iile many assumptions
people hold may

be "wrong" or misguided at some fundamental level, they
are crucial
in maintaining a sense of well-being and prtxiuctivity
in life.

A

belief in personal invulnerability, for instance, may be
an illusory

but vital "false" assumption that enables an individual to
cope, and
thrive, in

v^t

is,

in actuality, a random and capricious world.

In The Denial of Death, Becker (1973) argues that all meaning

and productivity in life is derived from a false assumption, that of
immortality.

It is a denial of death that drives humans to seek

meaning or accorrplishment in their pursuits.

But in the context of a

deeper and inescapable reality this ascription of meaning is false, a
necessary but sham construction v^ich allows humans to function in
vihat

would otherwise be an existential abyss.
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CHAPIER V

RATIONAIE AND HYPOIHESES FOR THE PRESENT STUDY

Given the theoretical struc±ure of the assunptive world which

has been discussed, one expectation is that a traumatic event, such
as bereavement, will deeply affect an individual's underlying beliefs

about him or herself and the world.

And v*iile the grief literature,

both theoretical and specific, is replete with descriptions of
behavioral and emotional changes wrouc^t by death, there has been no

attempt to systematically explore and document the changes manifest

at the level of one's assunptive world.

The present study was

undertaken to examine how the experience of bereavement affected
individuals' assumptions and beliefs about life in general, their own
life, and how to ascribe meaning to the world.

First, it was predicted that bereavement would result in an

examination and reconceptualization of the bereaved individual's
assunptive world, and that these changes would remain incorporated in

the bereaved person's world views after the immediate event of the
loss.

It was hypothesized that bereaved individuals would view the

world as less benevolent, less just, less controllable and more
random than individuals who had never been bereaved (or suffered any
other significant trauma)
Second, it was predicted that bereaved individuals would report

more psychological and emotional distress than non-bereaved, nontraumatized individuals.
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Third, it was predicted that individuals
v^o had been bereaved

would have a lower sense of self-esteem than
individuals who had
never been bereaved or suffered a significant
trauma.
several divergent paths that led to this
hypothesis.

There were
First, the

interrelatedness of self-esteem and other aspects
of the assuitptive

world (most integral in the theory of Epstein) would
mean that as the
death significantly affects one's construction of
reality, it would
also affect self-esteem.

Related to this, Janoff-Bulman (e.g. 1985) has documented
the
relationship between victimization and lowered self-esteem.

While

bereavement cannot be considered victimization per se, it is similar
in its calling into question beliefs about personal vulnerability and

one's role in the world.

This change in perceived vulnerability in

itself may lead to a drop in self-esteem.

Also related to lowered self^orth is the feeling of guilt,
either behavioral or in a more characterological sense (as in the

phenomenon of "survivor" guilt) that is a common reaction to death.
In the Harvard Bereavement Project, Click, et al (1972) reported that
47% of the interviewed widows e^qpressed some self-reproach regarding

either the death or their relationship with their husband prior to
the death.

A strong feeling of guilt may be a cause

(or reflection)

of lowered self-esteem.
Finally, it was ejqjected that there would be associations

between an individual's assumptive world views, his or her
emotional/psychological state, and the intensity of his or her grief

over his or her loss.

Specifically, it was predicted that:
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a)

there

would be a strong relationship between the
intensity of grief and
psychological distress; and b) there would be a strong
relationship

between the bereaved individuals' assumptive views and
the intensity

of their grief, with the "higher" grievers beii^ less
able to ascribe
meaning to the world.
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CHAPTER VI

TYPE OF BEREAVEMENT:

FOCUS

m WSS OF A PARENT

The present study was conducted with individuals

vdio

had

ejq)erienced the death of a parent within the previous
36 months.

There were several reasons for having selected this
population.
First, despite the exploratory nature of part of the study,
limiting

the population under observation to a certain age groiip and
to a
certain type of loss enabled a more controlled scrutiny of the
data
and more reasonable cortparisons between subjects.
Second, a preliminary screening indicated that there was a

significant population of college-aged students v^o had recently lost

a parent.
Third, this is a population of interest in its own ri^t, about
vAiich surprisingly little has been observed.

While much has been

written about the effects of loss in childhood (cf
Solomon & Green, 1984)

,

.

Osterweis,

studies examining the consequences of

bereavement in adolescence are rare, as are studies of parent loss in
adulthood.

In order to examine the effects of bereavement on adolescents.

Balk (1983) interviewed 33 teenagers

had experienced a sibling's

He did not control for the recency of death (range:

death.

months)

v*io

.

4

to 84

Subjects reported experiencing many of the same emotional

reactions to the death as adults:
anger, fear and guilt.

shock, confusion, depression,

Balk also gathered objective data on the
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teenagers' self-concepts; however, this
information is difficult to

interpret due to the lack of a control grxjup.

laGrand (1981) surveyed 1,139 students attending
colleges or

universities in New York State regarding their
e>q)eriences with
"loss."

subtly

more than a quarter reported having esqDerienced

"the death of a loved one or sudden death, " but no
effort was made to

discern the type or recency of the death.
Studying parent loss in an adult population, Horowitz, et al.
(Horowitz, Kri^nick, Kaltreider, Wilner, Leong and Marmar,
1979;

Horowitz, Weiss, Kaltreider, Krupnick, Marmar, Wilner & DeWitt,
1984)

compared 35 adults seeking psychotherapeutic treatment after the

death of a parent with 37 field subjects
death of a parent but

v*io

vdio

had also experienced the

didn't seek treatment.

No non-bereaved

control

grov:^)

women.

The patient group consisted of 33 women and two men.

was used.

The field

groi:^)

consisted of 19 men and 18

The patient groi:^ reported significantly more problems with
adjustment and symptoms of depression, although both groups reported

depression and intrusive mental ejqDeriences (as measured by the
Stress Response Rating Scale)

.

The patient group, in addition to

being overwhelmingly coirposed of women, had experienced a
significantly

hi^er number of

unejqjected deaths.

At a 13-month

follow-i:^, after the patient groi:^ had been involved in a time-

limited dynamic therapy, there were no significant differences in
self-reported syiiptoms between the two

groi:5)s.

Still, the authors

conclude that "the death of a parent is a serious life event that
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,

leads to a measurable degree of symptanatic
distress in many persons

v^o do not seek therapy" (Horowitz, et al.,
1979).
Horowitz, et al. found that, regardless of the
gender of the
subject, loss of a mother was a more difficult
event than loss of a
father.
vAio

This is in contrast to the findings of Birtchnell
(1975)

argued that the loss of the opposite sex parent is the
more

difficult type of parent loss.

Further, ccnparing the percentage of

recently bereaved individuals seeking psychiatric treatment (as
recorded in the North-Eastem Regional Psychiatric Case Register
in
Scotland) with the expected numbers of recently bereaved adults in

the general population, Birtchnell found that the recent death of a
father, but not the recent death of a mother, was a significant

precursor to seeking psychiatric help.
Malinak, Hoyt and Patterson (1979) interviewed 14 adults v^o had

experienced the death of a parent 3-20 months prior to the interview.

While not an empirical study, their findings suggest that loss of a
parent can be a traumatic and inportant event in a non-clinical
population.

Adding another perspective, Osterweis, Solomon and Green (1984)
propose that a parent's death may serve as a "developmental push."

Given the change in familial roles and self-concept that such a death

may signify, they suggest that "the awareness that there are no
longer parents to fall back on may effect a more mature stance in

parentally bereaved adults
children"

(p. 85)

.

\A\o

no longer think of themselves as

This may be especially true with a college aged
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population, for this groi^ is already at a
juncture of changing self-

definitions.
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CHAPTER VII

METHOD
Subjects
Subjects were 54 undergraduates at the University
of
Massachusetts.

Twenty-seven had

ej^ienced the death of

a parent in

the three years prior to the study, and the remaining
27 were matched
controls.

Bereaved subjects who were interested in participating,

but v^ose parent had died by either murder or suicide,
were excluded
from the study.

Bereaved subjects were solicited by an announcement made by the
e3^)erimenter in large undergraduate classes.

The majority of the

subjects were recruited from introductory psychology classes and
were

not psychology majors.

Potential subjects were informed of the

criteria for the study (e.g. the recency and type of loss) and were

told that the general aim of the study was to learn vtot their
experiences of bereavement had been like.

The non-bereaved control subjects were solicited by written
advertisement posted in a designated subject-recruitment area in the

psychology building.

The recruitment poster asked subjects to fill

out questionnaires regarding their views of the world, themselves,
and their psychological well-being.

Control subjects were thus not

informed that they were to be coirpared with a bereaved population.
Potential control subjects v^o indicated that they had ej^Derienced a

"significantly traumatic" event in the past three years (such as

severe illness, violent crime, sexual abuse, or any event that they
labelled for themselves as "significantly traumatic") were excluded
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from the study.

Control subjects

their participation.

reived

"e>^iinental credit" for

Bereaved subjects were given the option
of

receiving ej^iniental credit or five dollars
reimbursenvent.

Non-

bereaved control subjects were matched with
bereaved subjects for
gender, age, year in school, and, as carefully
as possible, size of
family, religion, self-reported degree of
religiosity of upbringing,

and SES.

Of the 27 bereaved subjects, six were excluded from the
analyses
for the following reasons:

two (a 37 year old male and a 39 year old

female) were too far out of the age range; one subject's
father had

committed suicide; one subject reported about the death of her stepfather, v*iom she had never considered her father; one subject
had

first filled out the control questionnaires before volunteering as a

bereaved subject (her father had died in the interim)

;

and one

subject was judged by the ejqserimenter to be inappropriate due to a

presentation during vAiich suggested a long history of poor
psychological and mental functioning, regandless of reactions to his
father's death.

Additionally, one subject, included in the

quantitative analyses, chose not to participate in the interview.

This left a final saiiple of 42 subjects (21 bereaved subjects with

their matched controls)
groi^.

,

with 15 females and 6 males within each

For both males and females, there was approximately a 2;1

ratio of father loss to mother loss.

Two female subjects had

e>5)erienced the deaths of both parents.

The mean age of bereaved subjects was 19.8 years old, and the

mean age of parents at time of death was 51 years old, with a range
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between 42 and 62 years,
months prior to the

tli»e

ihe deaths had occurred between
2 and 36
of the study, with a mean of 19
months and a

median of 18 months.

Procedure

The study consisted of two parts,

in the first part, all

subjects completed several objective measures, in
order to make

conparisons between the bereaved and non-bereaved
control subjects.

The second part of the study looked within the bereaved
sairple alone.

To gain additional data regarding the experiences of this
group, the
bereaved subjects participated in a semi-structured clinical
interview.

All subjects corrpleted the following objective measures:

World Assuitptions Scale, or WAS (Janoff-Bulman, in press)

the

;

Rosenberg's (1965) self-esteem scale; Synptom Checklist, or SCI/-90-R
(Derogatis, et al., 1977); I,P&C Scales for Locus of Control
(iBvenson, 1972)
1975)

.

;

and the Mother-Father-Peer (M-F-P) Scale (Epstein,

Additionally, bereaved subjects conpleted the Texas Grief

Inventory, or TGI (Zisook, et al, 1982; Faschingbauer, et al., 1977).

The World Assumptions Scale is a 32-item self-report measure
designed to assess an individual's assunptive belief system.
Individuals rate items such as "There is more good than evil in the

world" or "The course of our lives is largely determined by chance"
on a six-point scale, with choices of strongly disagree, moderately
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disagree, sli^tly disagree, sli^tly
agree, moderately agree, and

strongly agree.

The WAS examines three main belief systems:

the benevolence of

the world, the meaningfulness of the world,
and the worthiness of the
self.

These main scales are comprised of

representing more specific beliefs.

ei^t

subscales

Thus, the Meaning scale measures

an individual's beliefs in justice, control, and randomness.

The

Benevolence Scale measures beliefs in benevolence of the
world in

general and the benevolence of people.

The Self-worth Scale is

comprised of beliefs in self-esteem, the perceived amount of
selfcontrol one has in one's fate, and beliefs in self-perceived luck.

A

second, 10-item self-esteem measure (Rosenberg, 1965) was

included to further examine the possible effects of bereavement on

beliefs of self-worthiness.

Subjects responded to statements such as

"I am able to do things as well as most other people" on a 4 point

scale:

strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree.

The Symptom Checklist (SCL-90-R) is a widely used instrument,

with ample normative data.

It is a 90-item self-report scale

designed to measure emotional and psychological distress.

Subscales

include somatization, obsession-compulsion, interpersonal
sensitivity, anxiety, depression, hostility, phobic behavior,
paranoia, and psychoticism.

Subjects report the extent to v^ich, in

the previous week, they have experienced 90 possible symptoms.
Responses range from "not at all" to "extrejnely."

A global measure

of distress, the Positive Syirptom Total, records the total number of
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"

positively endorsed items, regardless of
the degr^ to v^ich each
item is endorsed.

Ibe I,P&C Scales for locos of Control
(Levenson, 1972) is a 24item measure which expands the construct
of internal vs. external
control by employing three scales:
Chance.

Internal, Powerful Others, and

I^venson augmented the locus of control model
to this

tripartite structure to separate "external" believes
in which an
individual believes in chance from those in which
he/she believes

that control is in the hands of powerful others.

Exaiiples of items

are "When I get v*iat I want, it's usually because I'm
lucky" and
"Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly
on the other
driver.

The M-F-P Scale (Epstein, 1975) was included to provide
information regarding the nature of the relationship between the

subject and the deceased parent in the subject's childhood.
responded, for each parent separately, to such items as:

a child,

ray

Subjects

"When I was

(mother/ father) encouraged me to do things for myself"

and "...my (mother/ father) was someone I found very difficult to
please."

The

M-F-P Scale measures perceptions of

overprotectiveness, independence encouragement, rejection, and

acceptance with each parent.
idealization.
\i\^o

An additional measure taps parental

Malinak et al. (1979), in their interviews with adults

had recently experienced the death of a parent, found that

subjects tended to idealize their deceased parent.

The Texas Grief Inventory, filled out only by bereaved subjects,
is a 58-item self-report scale vAiich measures the extent to v^ich an
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individual continues to grieve for a
prior loss.

three measures:
Present Grief)

;

The scale yields

one subscale for "present feelings"
(here labelled
a second subscale for "past behavior
and feelings

ijnmediately following the object loss" (here
labelled Past Grief)

and a global score for grief, here labelled
the two subscales.

Itotal Grief,

;

combining

Saitple items are "Now I can talk about
the person

without discomfort," "I feel guilty

v*ien I

think about higher," and

"I still get i^5set when I think about the person
v*io died."

respond on a five point scale:

Subjects

completely false, nostly false,

partly true and partly false, mostly true, and cortpletely
true.
The interviews with bereaved subjects took place usually
within
one week after they had filled out the questionnaires.

At the time

of the interviews, the interviewer was blind as to the subjects'
responses on the questionnaires.

Interviews followed a semi-

structured format, with a list of specific questions to be addressed,
as much as possible, in a specific order.

The questions were

designed to encourage an exploration of the subjects' attitudes and
beliefs about life and the world, and how these have been affected by
bereavement.
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CHAPTER VIII
RESULTS

Analyses indicated that, in this study, males
and females did

not differ significantly on any variables.

Analyses of Variance

indicated that there were no significant main effects
of gender or

significant interactions between gender of the bereaved
subject and

mother-loss or father-loss.

Gender, therefore, will not be further

discussed.

Table 1 displays the reliability coefficients for all the
objective measures.

As can be seen, all the scales, with the sole

exception of the Phobic Behavior subscale of the SCI/-90-R, proved
to

be extremely reliable.

The reliabilities for the three global scales

of the World Assunptions Scale

— Meaning,

Benevolence, and Self-

worth —were .76, .87 and .80, respectively.

Correlational data for

the entire subject population on all relevant measures are presented
in the Appendix.

Comparisons Between the Bereaved Group and the Control Group

Analyses revealed that the bereaved and non-bereaved control

group differed significantly both on measures of psychological
functioning and measures tapping assumptive beliefs.

Table

2

reports

the mean scores and the results of two-tailed t-tests on all measures
comparing the bereaved and non-bereaved groups.

On the Positive Symptom Total of the SCL-90-R, a global measure
of symptomatic distress, bereaved subjects manifested significantly
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Table

1

Reliability Coefficie nts

fnr-

ai i

Measure

Measnr^<.
„
at
Alpha
Coefficient
i_

World Assumptions Sca1f>
Meaning
Just World
Control
Randomness
Benevolence
Benevolent People
Benevolent World
Self-worth
Self esteem
Personal Control
Luck

.

.76
.75
.76
.67
.87
'73
'gi
]go
33
gg
[go

Self Es teem (Rosenberg)

.83

M - F - P Scale
Mother Overprotectiveness
Mother Independence-encouragement
Mother Acceptance
Mother Rejection
Mother Idealization
Father Overprotectiveness
Father Independence-encouragement
Father Acceptance
Father Rejection
Father Idealization

.75
.85
.81
.84
.75
.74
.88
.89
.79
.85

I. P. & C Scale
Internal
Powerful Others
Chance

.77
.71
.78

Texas Grief Inventory
Past Grief
Present Grief
Total Grief

.82
.87
.91

SCL-90-R
Somatization
Obsession-compulsion
Interpersonal Sensitivity
Depression
Anxiety
Hostility
Phobic Behavior
Paranoia
Psychoticism

.78
.86
.91
.90
.85
.78
.31
.80
.81
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Table 2
Dif f^ences Between Bereaved and
Control Groups
on Assimiptive Beliefs, Psychological
FunctioningTand
Perc^tions of Parent / Child Relationship

Measure

Bereaved
Group
Mean

Self-esteem

32 .57

Control
Group
Mean

t-value
(2-tailed)

32.19

(Rosenberg)

.27

cif

P

40

7Q

World Assumotions Scale

Meaning
Just World
Control
Randomness

8 .10
11 .33
12 .38
15 .62

13.00
12.95
13.90
13.86

-2.09
-1.37
-1.45
1.52

40
40
40
40

.04*
.18
.16

35 .81

36.38
17.67
18.71

- .26
- .08
- .43

40
40
40

.80
.94
.67

57.29
19.90
17.86
19.52

-1.17

40
40
40
40

.25
.94
.17
.16

2.05

40
40
40

.09
.37
.05*

Benevolent World 17 .57
Benevolent People 18 .24

Self Worth
Self-esteem
Luck
Persona 1 fV»n+- rr^l

54 .67
20 .00
16 .29
18 .38

.08

-1.40
-1.44

.14

I,P&C Scale
Internal
Powerful Others
Chance

34,.38

22,.05

24..29

37.52
20.48
20.38

-1.72
.91

Mother Scale
Overprotectiveness
Independence
Encouragement
Acceptance
Rejection
Idealization

22.,38
29. 67

20.86
29.81

.80
- .09

40
40

.42
.93

36. 38

35.52
10.67
19.71

.61
- .58
1.14

40
40
40

.55
.57
.26

9. 86

21. 62

continued, next page
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Table

2

(continued)

Bereaved
Group
Mean

Measure

Control
Group
Mean

t-value
(2-tailed)

df

Father Scalf^

Overprotectiveness
Independence
Encouragement
Acceptance
Rejection
Idealization

21. 76
28. 81

18.25
30. 10

-

.74

39
39

08
46

33. 38
12. 23
19. 05

31.85
13.05
18.30

-

.75
.55
.36

39
39
39

46
59

27.05

2.33

40

.31
.46
.36

.37

1.49
2

09

40
40
40

.40
.26
.26
.06
.25
.17

1.85
2.72
1.55
2.04
2.66
2.33

40
40
40
40
40
40

1.82

72

SCL~90-R

Positive Symptom
4 0.19
Total
Somatization
.34
Obsession-Compulsion .59
Interpersonal
54
Sensitivity
Depression
.55
Anxiety
.49
Hostility
.40
Phobic Behavior
16
Paranoia
.50
Psychoticism
.35
.

.

£

<

.05;

p

<

.01
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.

.

03*

.71
14
.

.

04*

.

07

.

01**

.
.

.

.

13

05*
01**
03*

more

syitptcans

2.33,

than c»ntrol subjects (40.19 vs.
27.05, t

p <.05).

(40)

=

T-tests also revealed significant
differences

between the two groups on five of the nine
subscales of the SClr-90R:

anxiety (.49 vs. .26, t

vs.

.25,

t

(40)

= 2.66, p = .01),

vs.

.36,

t

(40)

= 2.09, p < .05), phobic behavior (.16 vs.

(40)

= 2.04, p <

2.33,

p <

.05)

.

= 2.72, p = .01); paranoia
(.50

(40)

interpersonal sensitivity (.54

.05), and psychoticism (.35 vs.

.17,

t

(40)

=

The difference between the two groups on the

depression subscale was marginally significant (.55 vs.

= 1.85, p <

t

.06,

.40,

t

(40)

.10)

Analyses indicated that the two groups differed significantly
on the Meaning scale of the World Assumption Scale (8.10 vs.
13.00,

t

(40)

= -2.09, p <

.05)

and the Chance scale of the I,P

(24.29 vs. 20.38, t (40) = 2.05,

p <

.05).

&

C scale

The bereaved group

reported higher beliefs in chance and lower beliefs in meaning than

the non-bereaved control group.

As Table

2 indicates,

the groups

did not differ significantly on any of the remaining variables.

To further explore differences between the two groups'
assunptive beliefs, a discriminant analysis was used to determine
v^iat

best distinguished the two groups. All scales tapping beliefs

and the Positive Symptom Total of the SCL-90-R were entered.

The

best predictors of grief, each of v*iich (as discussed above) was
statistically significant indivdually, were the Positive Symptom
Total and the Meaning scale of the WAS.

Taken together, these two

measures strongly differentiated the two groups (F(2,39) = 4.43,

Wilks

=

.81,

p =

.01)
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Ccfmparisons Within the Bereaved Group

In the next set of analyses, the
bereaved sample was studied
alone, in order to detennine the variables
that were associated

with intensity of grief.

Table

3

lists the corr^ations between

the three subscales of the Texas Grief Inventory
and the other
measures.

As was expected, grief was strongly associated with
symptomatology as measured by the SCI/-90-R.

The correlation

between scores on the Total Grief measure of the Texas
Grief
Inventory and the Positive Symptom Total of the SCL-90-R
was .57
< .005)

(p

The higher the level of unresolved grief, the greater the

.

level of self-reported psychological distress.

Correlational analyses also revealed striking relationships

between the intensity of grief and the
assumptions.

bereaved subjects' basic

Perceived meaningfulness of the world, as measured by

the Meaning Scale of the

WS, was

negatively correlated with the

Total Grief measure of the TGI at r

(20)

= -.55, p < .01; the lower

the perceived meaningfulness of the world, the greater the
intensity of the grief.

When the coirponent measures of

meaningfulness were examined (beliefs in justice, randomness, and
control)

,

significant correlations between these beliefs and the

Total Grief measure of the TGI were found for all three, indicating

that the greater the grief, the more the bereaved individuals saw

the world as random (r

(20)

=

.38,

p =

.05), and the less they saw

it as just (r (20) = -.41, p < .05) and controllable (r (20) = .42,

p <

.05).

Similarly, beliefs in chance and powerful others,

as measured by the Levenson scale, were also strongly correlated
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Table 3

I^ationship of the Texas Grief Inventory
to Assumptive
n^K^ioning,
Quid p'^^^^'S?^^
Relationship, and Relevant Itometers
of Grieving

I^vei^S^/

Snf

Variable

Past
Grief

Months since Death

-.16

Present
Grief

Total
Grief

-.49*

-.38*

.33

.31

Months warning of Death

.22

Self-esteem (Rosenberg)

-.37*

-.17

-.28

Meaning
Just World
Control

-.54**
-.36
-.26
.51**

-.48*
-.38*

-.55**
-.41*

.22

.37*

Benevolence
Benevolent World
Benevolent People

-.07
-.21

-.10
-.20

-.09
-.22

.08

.03

.06

Self Worth
Self-esteem
Luck
Personal Control

-.40*
-.34
-.15
-.34

-.33
-.24
-.11
-.39*

-.40*
-.31
-.14
-.40*

Internal

-.12

-.14

-.14

Randcxnness

Chance

.56***

.55**

.60***

Powerful Others

.53**

.41*

.51**

.48*

.51**

Mother Overprotectiveness .44*

Mother Indepeodence
Encouragement

-.35

-.28

-.34

Mother Acceptance

-.07

-.07

-.08

Mother Rejection

-.04

.12

.06

.04

.01

.02

Mother Idealization

continued, next page
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Table

3

(continued)

Variable

Past
Grief

Father Overprotectiveness .61***

Present
Grief
.40*

Total
Grief
.54**

Father Independence
Encouragement

-.41*

Father Acceptance

-.2 0

35

-.31

Father Rejection

-.02

-.03

01

Father Idealization

.25

.16

.22

Positive Symptom Total

.47*

.55**

Somatization

.45*

.49*

.52**

Obsession-Compulsion

.49**

.42*

49**

-.33

(SCL-90)

-.40*

57***

Interpersonal Sensitivity .37

.37

.40*

Depression

.42*

.57***

.56***

Anxiety

.25

.39*

.36

Hostility

.05

.05

.05

Phobic Behavior

.48*

.59***

.59***

Paranoia

.25

.34

.33

Psychoticism

.46*

.57***

.57***

*

E

<

Note:

.05;

** E <

.01;

*** p < .005; two-tailed

degrees of freedom = 20.
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with grieving (r
(20)

=

.50,

= .60, p < .005 for Chance and

(20)

p =.01 for Powerful Others and

Itotal Grief; r

Itotal Grief)

The more

.

the bereaved subjects believed in chance
and powerful others in

detemining outcomes, the greater their grief.
Self-vorth beliefs were also related to grieving.

Scores on

the self-worth scale of the World Assumptions
Scale were negatively
correlated (r

(20)

= -40., p <

.05)

with the

Ttotal

Grief score.

Rosenberg's self-esteem scale was significantly correlated
with the
Past Grief measure of the TGI (r

(20)

= -.37, p =

.05)

.

The

greater one's perception of self-worth, the less intense
one's
grief.

In addition to being related to the basic assumptions of the
bereaved, the intensity of grief was strongly correlated with the

recency of death.

The more time since the death, the lower the

reported levels of Present Grief (r

Grief (r

(20)

= -.38, p <

.05)

.

(20)

= -.49, p =

.01)

and Total

In this study, v^ether the death

was sudden or unej^jected was unrelated to grieving response.

A t-test comparing subjects

vdio

within the past 14 months with those

had experienced their loss
v*io

had ejqjerienced the loss

more than 17 months earlier^ revealed significant differences in
grieving and in syiiptomatology between these two groups.
vAio

Subjects

had experienced a more recent death showed significantly higher

scores on the Present Grief measure of the TGI (101.56 vs. 86.00, t
(18)

= 2.30, p <

.05)

.

On the Positive Symptom Total of the SCL-

90-R, the more recently bereaved subjects reported significantly

^ In this sample, there were no subjects v^o reported the loss
to have been 15 or 16 months prior to the study.
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more synptams (50.56 vs. 32.83, t

(19)

= 2.23, p < .05).

However,

there were no significant differences in
basic assunptions between
these two groups. Siitiilarly, the beliefs
measures, despite their
strong correlations with the TGI, did not
correlate significantly

with the recency of the death.
Finally, Epstein's Mbther-Father-Peer Scale
yielded a few

intriguing results.

Contrary to e>$)ectations, no differences

emerged between the bereaved and control populations
in terms of
parental idealization.

However, within the bereaved population,

intensity of grieving was strongly correlated with degree
of

reported parental overprotectiveness in childhood.
correlations (r

(20)

=

.51,

p =.01 and r

(20)

=

.54,

These

p <

.01 for

mother's overprotectiveness and father's overprotectiveness with
Total Grief, respectively) did not depend upon which parent had
died.

Separate analyses for the mother-died and father-died groups

indicated that in both cases, the higher the reported parental
overprotectiveness, the more pronounced the grief reaction.

Both

maternal and paternal overprotectiveness were also significantly

correlated with the Positive Syitptom Total of the SCL-90-R (r

=

p <

.45,

.05 and r (21) = .43,

p <

overprotectiveness, respectively)

.

(21)

.05 for maternal and paternal

The greater the self-perceived

degree of overprotectiveness in childhood, the greater the current
psychological distress.

A stepwise multiple regression was used to determine
most strongly associated with grieving.

v*iat

was

Entered into the analysis

were the three scales of the WAS (Meaning, Benevolence, and Selfworth)

,

the amount of time (measured in months) since the death,
48

and the scales for mother and father
overpratectiveness.

The

dependent variable was the Total Grief
scale of the TCI.

The

factors which emerged as most strongly
associated with grief were
Meaning, Father overprotectiveness, and
the months since the death
(F (3,16)

.65,

= 9.73, p < .001)

.

Ihe R Square for this equation was

indicating that taken together, these variables
accounted for

65% of the variance.
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CHAPTER IX
DISCUSSION OF QUANTITAnVE DATA

Several findings of the present study have
already been fairly

well-established in the literature on grievii^
and are in

with commonly held notions of grief in this
culture.

acxx^rxi

The overall

difference in symptomatology between the bereaved
and control
groups, the high correlation between recency
of death and degree of
grief, and the high correlation between the degree
of grief and
syirptomatic distress are all previously documented
and ej^jected

findings.

What emerged of note was the important role of certain
basic
assumptions, particularly those related to perceptions of
meaning,

in the grieving process.

groi^ differ

Not only did the bereaved and control

in perceived meaningfulness of the world and the

related perception of chance, but, among the bereaved subjects, the
intensity of grieving was strongly related to these beliefs.

The bereaved individuals experienced, amid the other changes
wrought by their loss, a serious i:pheaval in how they made sense of

the world.

What was disrupted was the ability, found in their non-

bereaved, non-traumatized peers, to ascribe meaning to the world

with traditional Western concepts of justice and control.

For the

bereaved individuals, events had come to be seen as more random,
people were viewed to have less control over their own fate, and
chance became recognized as a force to be acknowledged.

As there

is no reason to assume that the bereaved subjects, prior to their
loss, held different assumptive beliefs than the control subjects,
50

it seems litely that the bereavement was an event which,
like other
traumas, led to a serious questioning, shattering, renegotiating
or

redefining of how to ascribe meaning to the world.
It is also noteworthy that these alterations in belief were

not associated with the recency of the death.

appear to change as a function of

tiine

The beliefs did not

within the grieving process.

Given the strong association between intensity of grieving and
these basic beliefs, it is interesting to speculate about the
possibility that once beliefs change (e.g., once one sees the world
as more meaningless)

,

these altered beliefs are likely to persist.

(In support of this interpretation is an eirpirical study by Janoff-

Bulman (in press) that found differences in basic assuirptions

between victims and non-victims ten to fifteen years after the
victimizing event.)
It is also interesting to examine how this bereaved sairple

differed from other traumatized populations, and specifically how

the bereavement did not alter subjects' beliefs in the benevolence
of the world (both the bereaved and control groups saw the world as
a benevolent place)

.

Unlike other traumatic events, bereavement

does not usually involve any breach of interpersonal trust, nor

does it violate any basic assunption of societal goodwill or
safety.

Additionally, several factors may actually serve to

strengthen, rather than mitigate, an individual's sense of

benevolence in the world.

The outpouring of social support v*iich

frequently accorppanies a bereavement (albeit not without its
dravfcacks, such as those discussed by Lehman, Wortman and Williams,

1987)

,

the strengthening of remaining familial and intimate bonds,
51

and a newly discx3vered appreciation of
the importance of close
interpersonal relationships may all enable an
individual to develop

a more benevolent view of the world than
he/she previously held.

Althou^ there were no belief-related differences
among the
bereaved subjects in terms of vdiether the death was
sudden or
anticipated, it is likely that the data fron this
study are not

adequate to address the issue of the impact of sudden
vs.

anticipated death.

three factors.

The data are confounded, in this regard, by

First, all but two subjects lost their parent to

natural causes, i.e. illness rather than accident.

It is therefore

impossible in this study to determine, systematically and
comparatively, v*iat the effects of an accidental death may be on
an

individual's assumptive beliefs.

Second, several subjects reported

that the death was "sudden" and unanticipated, but then placed this

within a context of a long illness.

It was the rare event of, for

example, death by heart attack with no previous history of cardiac

disturbance.

Third, many subjects were aware of a lengthy illness

but not of the illness' severity.

Most of the subjects were

adolescents at the time of their bereavement, and many felt that

they were shielded from knowing the severity of the situation as it
progressed.

Several reported having had only short notice, perhaps

a matter of days or weeks, of a death v*iich other family members

had long been e3q)ecting.

Thus,

v^le

it reasonable to speculate

that a death viiich is entirely urpredicted will lead to a greater
disruption in an individual's assurrptive beliefs, that question
cannot be addressed by this study.
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Within the bereaved

saitple, the

dramatic correlation between

the intensity of grief and the disnipted
ability to ascribe nmning
to the world suggests that, for sane
individuals, the loss was a

much more disturbing event—a more traumatic
event—than for
others.

A fuller examination of the relationship between
the

intensity of grief and the disrription of previously
held

assumptions is discussed in Chapter X.

The finding that the bereaved subjects did not
idealize

their lost parent to a greater extent than the
non-bereaved
subjects may be an artifact of the measure used to tap
this belief.

The data suggest, in fact, that both groups idealized
their parents
to a strong degree.

Epstein (personal corranunication, 1988) has

recently updated the M-F-P scale to remove the parental
idealization measure, because of the finding that college age

students consistently score high on this measure.

The qualitative

data suggest that for several of the bereaved subjects, but not a
majority, the death did result in an increased idealization of the

deceased parent.

However, this phenomenon was only sporadically

reported, and parental idealization did not correlate in a

systematic way with the grief or belief measures.

The finding that self -perceived overprotectiveness in
childhood was strongly correlated with both intensity of grief and
self-reported psychological distress was une^q^ected.

As already

noted, in determining the strength of the grief reaction, it did

not appear to matter if the overprotective parent was the one

had died or the one

v^io

vAio

remained alive; v*iat mattered instead was

53

the perception of overprotectiveness
in childhood by either parent.
How can this datum be understood?

One ejqDlanation may be that the
overprotected subjects would
have felt themselves ill-equipped to deal
with any significant life
event v^ch required independence and
a reliance upon their own

interml resources.

When the major life event with v^iich they
were

faced was in fact the death of an overprotective
parent, the effect

was compounded by the very nature of the loss:

not only did the

bereaved individuals face a major traumatic event
on their own, but

the person whom they perceived would usually take
care of the
trouble, or take care of them, was no longer there.

There is some reason to believe that the assumptive beliefs

that are most disripted for the overprotected subjects relate
more

to their self-concept and self-worth than to how they ascribe
meaning to the world.

While neither the overprotectiveness nor the

independence-encouragement^ measures of the M-F-P scale correlated

significantly with beliefs regarding meaning or chance, the
correlations of independence-encouragement were dramatically

associated with the self-esteem measures:

Rosenberg's self-esteem

measure and perx:eived maternal independence-encouragement
correlated at r = .72 (p < .001)

;

paternal independence-

•5

On the M-F-P Scale, the overprotectiveness and independenceencouragement measures are conceptualized as the inverse of one
another, as are the acceptance and rejection measures. However, as
each scale is distinctly cotprised of different items, they do not
form absolute inverse relationships. In this sairple, the
correlation for maternal overprotectiveness and independenceencouragement was -.57 (p < .005) ; the correlation for paternal
overprotectiveness and independence-encouragement was -.43 ( p <
.05)
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encouragement and the Rosenberg Scale correlated at r = .41
(p <
.05)

.

The more a subject perceived that he or she had been

encouraged towards independence in childhood (i.e., the less
overprotective he or she viewed his parents)

,

the greater his or

her self worth and the less pronounced his or her grief reaction.
Similarly, Epstein (in press)

r^rts

that perceived independence-

encouragement in childhood is more strongly associated with current

beliefs in meaning and self-worth than with specific life events.

In summary, it appears that the loss of a loved one

frequently served as a catalyst for the forced scrutiny of several

of an individual's fundamental, frequently tacitly held, beliefs.
This disrt^jtion was most apparent in the realm of ascribing meaning

to the world, and led to a decreasing ability to make sense of the
world in a previously acceptable manner.
Is it possible, or necessary, to place judgment on these

changes in assuirptive beliefs

— is

it inherently better or worse to

believe that events are distributed to people randomly, that

misfortune can or cannot be averted?
other wrong?

Is one belief ri^t, the

In terms of psychological distress, the data suggest

that there is not a siirple answer to this question:

the inability

to ascribe meaning, so closely tied to the degree of reported
grief, made little difference in and of itself in terms of the

symptomatic distress as reported on the SCL-90-R.

In other words,

a change in assurrptions regarding meaning need not be accompanied

by psychological dysfunction.
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To look more closely at this relationship
between

ineaning,

grief, and symptomatic distress, the qualitative
interviews with

bereaved iixiividuals were analyzed in detail.

The following

chapter presents an overview of the interview data,
with specific
emphasis on how the bereavement affected subject's
assumptions

regarding meaning.
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CHAPTER X

ANALYSIS OF QUAnETATIVE DATA I:
AN OVERVIEW

In order to gain more in-d^th data regarding the effects of

the bereavement on the individuals' lives and assunptive beliefs,
each bereaved subject was interviewed in an intensive, semistructured clinical interview.

from 45 minutes to
hours.

3

The interviews ranged in length

hours; most lasted between 90 minutes and

2

One subject, included in the quantitative analyses, chose

not to participate in the interview; 20 bereaved subjects did
participate.

Ihe scope of the interviews was broad.

Each subject was asked

the same questions, in, as much as possible, the same order.

Among

other points, subjects were cisked to describe their own grief
processes, coping strategies, family reactions, and relationship

with the deceased parent.

Primarily, however, the focus of the

interviews was an examination of how the bereavement affected the
subjects' beliefs and assunptions.

Many subjects spoke at length,

and often with great eloquence, about the changes they had
experienced because of their loss.

These changes included

alterations in sane of their fundamental beliefs about life and how

they ascribe meaning to it.

The subjects were also able to

articulate how the ejqjerience of the death, and the process of
mourning, changed their perceptions of themselves.

57

How Bereaved Subjects Made Sense of

thr^ Tr>cg

All but two of the subjects responded "Yes"
to the question:
"Did you ever ask yourself ^Why (him or
her) '?"

One of these two

subjects reported that death is "scientific.
.you're biologically
.

bom, you live biologically, and you die because your
brain ceases
to function."

He added, however, that his father "was a very
sick

man, it's not like he was hit by a car," implying
that somehow

there was an explanation, or meaning, to his father's
death, but
not necessarily to all deaths.

The second subject who did not ask

"Why?" stated that he "accepted it at its face value.
.there's a
.

tiine

for everyone to die," and "[my father] was just sick and it

was time for him to die."

For both these individuals, their

parent's death fit into an already established conceptual schema of
life without disn:^ing it.
However, the remaining 18 subjects, or 90% of the total, did

ask "Why?," suggesting that for the vast majority of bereaved
individuals, some of their basic assumptions were being questioned.

For

scjme subjects,

this questioning ended in a reconfirmation or

strengthening of previously held beliefs; for others, the death was

the catalyst for a dramatic upheaval in how they made sense of the
world.

Although nearly all of the subjects responded that they had
asked "Why," many then said that they had not found any answer to

this question.

Fifty percent of the subjects stated that they had

never been able to satisfactorily answer the question of "Why," or
could only cinswer it by attributing it to fate, luck or chance.

One woman responded: "You can't help but have the feeling it's not
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fair.
.

.I'm still stuck on the why, I have
to figure out why. .it
.

seems like there's no reason, almost like
we were just picked out
of a hat." Another stated: "It was just
fate or luck or whatever

you want to call it, and you can't ejq^lain it
with a reason.

.

.1

don't think there is any answer to those types
of questions."
Fifty percent of the subjects, however, did find
answers to
"those types of questions."

Among this

grtx:?),

50% of subjects

provided more than one response, but it was not the
case that the

more explanations or reasons a subject provided, the
greater the
sense made.^

some individuals found strong meaning in a single,

powerful ejqjlanation.

How did the subjects ascribe meaning to the death?
percent attributed it to God's will.

Fifteen

"God wouldn't have taken him

unless it was really necessary, " and "I think [her death] was a
final exam God was giving her, and she passed" were sample

responses from this category.

Another 15% also believed the death

had some spiritual or religious meaning, but one v*iich they might
not necessarily comprehend:

"I believe in God, and I believe that

God had a reason, but I don't know

v^t

it is," or "I believe

there's a force of good in the world, and

v*ien good,

strong people

die, they became part of that, and that's v^iere I feel she is."

One subject stated that she believed in God and felt that the death

^ Because

many subjects responded with more than one answer to
this question as well as to several of the other questions
discussed in this chapter it follows that the reported percentages
of response will not necessarily total 100. The beginning of a
discussion of each question will report, from the total N, how many
subjects gave any response at all.

—

—
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was somehow "in

[ray

raother's] best interest," but could
not say

how.

IWenty-five percent of the subjects found some
meaning or
esqjlanation of the death in terms of their
own lives and

development.

Sample responses included:

"His influence on me was

so great that I thought ^Maybe it's just time for
me not to have

this anymore,' it's been a growing thing," or, more
directly: "If
there was any reason, it was probably to open my eyes and
force me

to grow

i:^."

Subjects also explained the death in terms of pragmatic,

behavioral causes.

Twenty percent attributed it, to varying

degrees, to their parent's health habits.

This view was most

succinctly captured in the response of one woman:
vdiy],

but he didn't take good care of himself.

He had the odds against him.

He smoked."

"Yes [I asked

He was overweight.

Another subject blamed

the doctors caring for her father, who were at fault "almost to a
point of negligence."

In her search for an explanation of the

death, she added: "we think subconsciously he didn't want to go

throu^ with the

[gall bladder] operation.

He had a big fear of

hospitals."

Twenty percent of the subjects mentioned that death is
something you accept as a part of life:

"things just happen,

there's no sense in fighting it. .death is something you accept,
.

you don't try to e^qjlain."

Related to this, several subjects

stated that they consciously make an effort not to determine a

cause or meaning:

"Someday I'd like to find a legitimate answer to
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^Why her,

'

but

ycxi

can't go around askir^ it all the time.

You'll

drive yourself crazy."
Finally, 15% of the subjects ej^lained the
death to

themselves, at least in part, by stating how much

could have been:

wor^

things

"I think it happened because it was best
for her,

rather than to go throu^ years of suffering."

Related to this,

many subjects mentioned that they thou^t the situation
was much
worse for their surviving parent than for them:
difficult for

father...! lost

ray

He lost everything."

ray raother,

but he lost his wife.

(One can imagine the same cognitive strategy

to minimize the loss employed by the father:
for my dau^ter. .1 lost
.

"It's very

ray

"It's very difficult

wife, but she lost her mother.

.

.

Through a variety of possibilities, then, many individuals had
found a way of explaining, understanding, conceptualizing, or

minimizing (at least cognitively) the death to themselves.

need to explain the death, to find a reason or meaning in

This
it,

was

very pressing for some subjects; hence, the response of the subject
quoted above:
v*iy."

"I'm still stuck on the

v*iy,

I

have to figure out

Subjects v^o had found an answer to the question "Why," be

it God's will or their mother's obesity, were striving to preserve

the assumptions v^ich had guided their lives before the
bereavement.

By minimizing the disruption to their assumptive

beliefs, by holding on to or even strengthening the rules with
viiich they had previously made sense of the world, they were

attempting to minimize the possible traumatic impact of the event.
In fact, those v^o were able to provide an answer to the

question "Why"

—^vtotever their answer
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(or combination of answers)

—

were grieving less than those who stated
that they could not find
an answer, or attriJauted it to fate or
chance,
in a t-test
comparing these two qroups, the group that
found no answer or

reason scored significantly hi^er on the

Ttotal

Grief measure of

the TGI than did the group that found sane
ejq)lanation5 (184.90 vs.
162.00, t (17) = 2.20,

p <

were grieving the

were those for whom the death was the most

roost

.05)

In other words, the subjects v^o

.

difficult to mate sense of or find meaning in.

Here is the

response to the question "Why" from the subject with the
hi^est
score (the most unresolved grief) on the TGI:
everyday.

There isn't a day that goes by.

I

"I ask ^v4iy'

get so mad.

someone to give me that answer, and no one can.

ever know that, ever find that out.

I

I want

don't think I'll

It's so unfair."

How the Bereavement Affected Subjects' Religious and Afterlife
Beliefs

As mi^t be expected, the bereavement affected the religious
and spiritual beliefs of many of the subjects.

Several subjects,

as detailed above, used religion to help find a meaning in the

^ This t-test also indicated a striking similarity between
this specific question viiether or not an individual was able to
find an answer to the question "Why" and the broader beliefrelated categories of the World Assuirption Scale and the I,E,& P

—

—

Scale. The two groi:^ (those that found an answer and those that
didn't) differed significantly on the Just World and Randomness
measures of the WAS and the Chance measure of the I,E & P scale
and, most dramatically, on the global Meaning Scale of the
(p<.05)
WAS (12.70 vs. 2.00, t (18) = 4.81, p <.001). Individuals v^o
found no answer to the "Why" question showed much greater beliefs
in chance and randomness, and much lover beliefs in justice and
conventional ways of ascribing meaning, than the individuals v*io
found some explanation.
,
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loss,

others found comfort in the religious
rituals that

surrounded the death and period of mourning.

And a majority of the

subjects reported finding solace in, or a
greater willingness to

entertain notions of, an afterlife.

For 50% of the subjects, the death did not alter
their
religious beliefs,

within this group, 70% (or 35% of the total

N)

reported that they were not religious before the death,
and did not

then became religious; 30% (or 15% of the total
the death did not affect

vdiat

N)

reported that

already was a strong religious

belief.

Twenty percent of the subjects indicated that ejqjeriencing the
loss had made them less religious.

"I was raised religiously,"

said a subject v^ose mother had died of cancer, "but after
something like that happened, it's hard to have faith in God."

Another subject stated:

God at times.

"I've gotten to the point v^ere I've hated

I feel like ^how could he do that,

had to have done it.

'

because someone

God took him in the wor^t way.

.

.1

believe

he's unbelievably unfair."

Ihe remaining 30% of the subjects reported that their parent's
death led them to develop stronger religious beliefs.

Some of

these subjects spoke in terms of organized religion, others
referred instead to a personal spiritual awakening.

For exaitple:

A lot of

ray ideas about death have changed in a more spiritual
nature. When things are fine and stable in your life, there's
not a real need for religion. .but something like death makes
you feel a lot more vulnerable, and religion helped me gain
more strength, a more centered feeling.
.

One subject stated, quite
ever.

sirrply:

That's how I coped with it."
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"It made me more religious than

Related to these changes in religious
beliefs, 60% of the
subjects iixiicated that the death strengthened
or altered their
belief in an afterlife.

Of the 40% who reported no change
in these

beliefs, 75% (or 30% of the total N) indicated
that they already

had a strong belief in an afterlife, vdiile
25% (or 10% of the total
N)

indicated that they didn't believe in an afterlife
previously

and the death had not affected this belief.

The subjects' beliefs in an afterlife fell into three
categories.

First, 25% of the subjects spoke of a strong,
firm

belief in the concept of heaven.

All but one of these subjects

placed this belief within the context of their strong and
traditional views of Christianity, with responses such as:

don't blame God.

"I

My mother says he's in a better place now, and

it's true."
Second, 10% of the subjects believed that an afterlife is

staying alive in the memories of people v^o are still living:

believe my mom has an afterlife because I remember her in
and my heart and I still love her.

ray

"I

mind

As far as heaven and hell,

I

don't know."
The third and by far most common belief, mentioned by 60% of
all subjects, was that there is some sort of an afterlife, but vtet

this is can be only vaguely articulated or understood.
Interestingly, many of these subjects were aware that they chose to

believe in an afterlife, without wanting to seriously test or
question this belief, because it offered them comfort.
stated:

One subject

"I have to believe that there is an afterlife, and that

it's wonderful, that it just hasn't stopped, that this isn't the
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end."

She added that her belief in an afterlife
is due to her

mother's death:

"I had no reason to be concerned or
especially

worried beforehand, and now I have to believe
that there's
something out there."

Another subject, who believed in heaven,

told of the admittedly paradoxical nature of her
beliefs:
"Sometimes [heaven] is hard to believe in v^ien I think
about it,

s(

I don't like to think about it too much because
then it doesn't

make sense.

I like to believe that, so I do, and I don't want
to

question it."
It seems clear, then, that experiencing the death of a parent

had a significant impact on how these individuals used religious
beliefs to make sense of the world.

Seventy percent of the

subjects reported a change in their attitude towarxis religion, an
afterlife, or both.

Of the few subjects

vdio

reported that the

death registered no impact on these beliefs, all but two already

had strong religious beliefs.

It is noteworthy that these two

subjects had several other similarities, including the fact that

they were among the lowest scorers on the TGI and the highest
scorers on the Meaning Scale of the

V3AS,

suggesting that, in

general, their bereavement caused little disruption in how they

ascribed meaning to the world.

How the Bereavement Affected Subjects' Self-Perceptions
Many of the subjects were able to articulate ways in v^ich
they felt their ejqjerience had changed them, in terms of their
self-concept, how they conducted interpersonal relationships, and

their beliefs and attitudes about life and the world.
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For some

individuals, the changes could be
characterized as negative, such
as seeing themselves as embittered,
or with a diminished capacity

to triist other people.

Other subjects

r^rted

primarily positive

changes, and spoke of how they were able
to use the loss as a

catalyst for personal growth.

Typically, individuals identified

several changes they had undergone, and the
changes didn't fit

neatly into an all-positive or all-negative
picture.

The data discussed here were gleaned primarily
ended interview questions:

frm

two open-

"How, if at all, has the experience of

your (mother's/father's) death affected or changed
you as a
person?"; and "How, if at all, has her/his death affected
any

beliefs you have about life or the world in general?"
presented in three general categories:

The data is

interpersonal changes,

intrapsychic changes, and changes in beliefs and/or world view.

Interpersonal changes

Seventy percent of the subjects spoke

of interpersonal changes in response to the questions above; the
remaining 30% either did not mention interpersonal issues or
spontaneously volunteered that they had not changed in this regard.
(Fifteen percent of the subjects responded that the death had not

changed them as individuals at all)

One half of the subjects regarded themselves as more open with
other people, more errpathic, or more caring than they had been
before the death; conversely, 30% of the subjects viewed themselves
as less open and less willing to trust.

One subject,

both of her parents in unrelated incidents, stated:
people.

I'm a little callous.

v*io

"I don't trust

I'm not a very sensitive
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had lost

person.
.

.When people cx^mplain about their
problems, I have a hard

time accepting it."
way:

Another subject put her wariness of
tnast this

"Something horrible has happened to someone
you're close to,

and you don't want to see it happen again."

A few subjects reported a seemingly contradictory
combination
of becoming both more and less trusting, or more
and less
compassionate.

One subject stated that she was more caring and

open with her immediate family, but less trusting of
people in
general.

The contradictory self reports of these subjects makes

sense vdien seen in terms of the upset to their assumptive
worlds.

Iheir previous belief in interpersonal trust or benevolence has

been disrupted, and remains in a state of confusion or disarray;
it
has likely not settled yet either in a new belief or a return to
the old.
Thirty percent of the subjects reported that they are less
reliant

i^n

other people or more independent:

independent; I relied on

[ray

father] a lot."

enphasized that she is now more reliant

i^n

"I'm becoming more

Only one subject
other people,

particularly her close friends.
Several subjects stated that they are now more honest in
interpersonal relationships or more appreciative of them.

reported drawing clearer lines in terms of

vy*io

Some

is iiiportant to them

and v^o is not, and spoke of a greater capacity to trust people,
but a more focused world within which they do so.

The majority of

subjects reported that they were closer with the remaining members

of their family.
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Intrapsychic charYTPS

Ei^ty percent of the subjects were
able

to identify changes related to their
self-perceptions, in tenns of
ego strength, internal motivation or drive,
or an ability to exert
contrcl in their lives.

Only three subjects in the total saitple

presented these changes in a predominantly
negative light; not
surprisingly, these three subjects were among
those for vdion the

quantitative measures, and a subjective impression
from the
interview, also indicated high levels of both grief
and syirptomatic

distress.

Sixty percent of the subjects—more than

half—r^rted

that

the death had been a catalyst for positive growth or change.
Individuals reported that it had matured them, made them stronger

for having gone throu^ the ej^ierience, and had tau^t them lessons

about life which were important to learn.

One subject stated that

in seme ways she felt "privileged" about having gone throu^ vdiat

she did, because of the wisdom she felt she had gained.

Said

another:

It made me grow up much faster than I would have. I was 19
years old, but in many ways I was a baby. .Her death made me
very strong no, I was strcng to begin with. It made me have
to exemplify ray strength.
.

—

Twenty percent of the subjects reported that they were more
driven towards acconplishment, or more focused in

to achieve in life, because of the death:

filter.

v4iat

they wanted

"It's made me more of a

I don't quit things easily if they're not working out,

because Mom could have given up at any time and said it's hopeless,

but she never gave up."

In response to the question of how the

death had affected her, another subject,
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v*io

is taking pre-med

courses, immediately answered:

"it

mde

ine

want to

becx:«ne

a

doctor.

In addition to these intrapsychic
chaises, three subjects

r^rted

that they had used the death to
implement positive health
related changes in their life, such
as quitting
smokii^, losing

wei^t, or starting to exercise.

Changes in Reliefs ^nd wot-ih

w-i^.,

Q^iy two subjects did not

inention a personal change due to the
bereavement that could apply

to this category,

within the remaining groi^, three other
subjects

stated that they believed that some of their
beliefs, such as a

belief in the fairness of life, changed because
of the death, but
then they

""went

back" to

v^t

they had been before; however, each

of these subjects also listed ways in
changed.

vMch

they felt they had

Several subjects (35%) reported changes in religious
or

spiritual beliefs, as discussed previously.

Forty-five percent of subjects felt that the experience had

led them to re-prioritize what they considered inportant in
life.

Some said they stopped taking friendships and relationships for
granted; others reflected on how they considered themselves to have

always been fortunate or lucky, but never knew it.

more aware of love.

Said one:

That's another thing I took for granted.

"I'm
I

never thou^t about it before, but I think about it a lot now. "

A

few spoke about how the loss put other difficulties into
perspective:

"Before

ray

Mom died, the littlest thing that bothered

me I would think was unfair,

liJce

v^y did I fail this exam. .but
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.

now, after the deaths, more
important, significant things
matter;

when you talk life and death compared to
insignificant things.
Ihirty-five percent of the subjects mentioned
that their

experience had left them feeling more somber
or serious, like they
had a broader, deeper understanding of life.
Many stated that they
felt older, maturer, that the death had forced
them to "grow up-

more quickly than they would have.

Some intimated that the pain of

the loss had taught them important but sobering
lessons:
Before my mother's death, I had an optimistic point
of view.
Now, I'm a little more realistic. .. it made me
realize bad
things happen to everyone. . .but I'm still pretty much
an
optimist. Things happen. It's bad, it's sad, it's
unfortunate, but things happen.

Thirty percent of the sample indicated that the death called
into question a belief in personal invulnerability or
immortality:
"It throws mortality in your face."

into you."

"It puts the idea of finality

One subject, while speaking about her diminished sense

of invulnerability, also commented on her surprise that this belief
wasn't totally obliterated.

This subject's father was killed in a

plane crash seven months prior to the interview:

"You never think

something like this is going to happen to you, it's always the

other person.
never know."

You see it on TV, but it's people you'll never meet,
She paused, and then added:

"I still have the

feeling that nothing can happen to me but it's not as strong.

don't know

vdiy I

.

.1

have it at all."

Finally, 25% of the subjects reported that the ejqperience had

left them feeling more bitter or cynical about life than they had
been:

"It made me think that life's not fair.
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I

know it sounds

Cliche and a lot of people say it,
but it actually made me realize
it."

Another subject tersely responded:

"I think the world is a

much crueler place thani used to think.
.the world's not fair,
used to think that justice and goodness
would
.

i

always come through

in the end.

It was a very idealistic belief, and a
very sti^id

As these brief samples demonstrate, almost all
of the subjects
were able to identify ways in vAiich their bereavement
had affected

how they interact with other people, how they viewed
themselves and
how they viewed the world.

Many commented on how their experience

led them to examine beliefs vdiich they didn't know they
held, but
vdiich nonetheless were fundamental to

how they dealt with life.

It is interesting that so many subjects were able to identify

positive aspects of the loss.

These were not individuals who were

denying the severity or the impact of the death; nor can these
subjects easily be categorized as those v^o were grieving much or

grieving little.

Parkes (1988), in his model of psychosocial

transitions, suggests that the conc^ts of "loss" and "gain" are

best viewed as endpoints of a continuum, and, within the sphere of
human activil^, few events will be v^olly one or the other.

It was

the exception, rather than the rule, for a subject not to be able

to identify some positive aspect of his or her experience.
Often, because of the magnitude of social convention, it

seemed as if there were a taboo against mentioning something
positive.

This was typified by the subject v^o stated:

"I've

gotten a little stronger frcm it," but then hastened to add:
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"that's not to say anything good ever
comes from it, but I think

people do get stronger."

While many subjects were able to identify
positive aspects of
their loss or alluded to possible benefits
of their ej^ience,
only one subject, whose attitudes about life
were profoundly
altered by her mother's protracted illness and
death, clearly
acknowledged how much she had gained

frxam

the death.

She was

unique among the subjects in that she was able to
speak both of her

great sense of loss and, inextricably tied with it,
her equally

great sense of gain:
The day she was diagnosed was rock bottom for me. .1 felt
like
the whole bottom had dropped out of ray world, that nothing
would be the same. But it's not like that. There's so much
good that came out of this. .Yes, it was hard, and if I could
choose I wouldn't have her die, because I still want her to be
here. But so many good things came out of that cancer!
There ^s so much more health in ray family than there was before
that it was a gift. You pay for things; the price was to
watch her die, but the benefit we'll all have for the rest of
our lives. I'll be a different mother than I would have been
before. You can't measure that and say: Was it worth it? In
a sense, no, it wasn't. Part of me says I'd go back to being
the person I was before if I could have her back, I'd give up
all the advances I've made if I could have her here to talk
to.
But part of me says No, you wouldn't. You had her, and
that was gift enou^. You got even more learning v*iat life
really is about, and it's about caring for people and loving
people and taking the tiine to do things that are important.
.

.

On a cautionary note, it is inportant to keep in mind that the
representative statements discussed in this section do not

necessarily convey the sincerity and gravity
vAiich they were delivered.

—or

lack thereof —with

It would have been easy for subjects to

follow cultural or stereotypical expectations, and provide several

earnest-sounding platitudes to adequately address the questions
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asked of them.

While it was seldom that I felt
this to be the

case, two things did seem clear to
me.

First, the deaths had varying levels
of impact on different

individuals.

The effects of the loss ranged from
minimal to

profound, and these varying effects of the
loss had a counterpart

in the varying degrees to

vMch

personal changes were felt.

intensity or degree of awareness with

v^ch

The

various individuals

spoke about the changes was often indicative of
how significant

these changes seemed to be.

To help minimize the possibility that

subjects were presenting answers

but

vMch

v^ch

they felt to be appropriate

they did not believe, I did not include for analysis
here

statements vdiich were made only after prodding, or which
were in

response to a forced-choice option.
Second, some subjects demonstrated a much greater capacity for

self-reflection, or a greater ability to articulate their selfreflections, than others.

A few subjects reported that they had

never thought about these issues before; for others, it had been a
primary way of conceptualizing their bereavement.

Some subjects,

then, were discussing changes v^iich they had already thought about

and reflected i^n; others were thinking about things for the first
time, and so at times felt more cautious about what they had to
say.

These caveats notwithstanding, subjects typically participated
in the interviews with an enthusiasm, self-awareness and openness
v\*iich

seemed admirably honest.

While subjects most likely brought

to the interview an investment in appearing a certain way (either
in the best, or, in some cases worst, possible li^t)
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,

my sense was

that the changes of

vMA

they spoke can be assumed
to be genuii«,

or at least genuinely motivated.

Ways to Keep
Itost

thP,

Deceased Parent "AT We^»

of the subjects revealed ways in
which they had developed

cognitive strategies with v^ch, on sane
deep, fundainental level,
they seemed to keep from fully admitting
the finality of the loss.
In most cases, this process appeared to
be

of the person's conscious awareness.

citing

beyond the ken

Nonetheless, many statements

the subjects made lent themselves to
systematic categorization, and
it was possible to determijie some of the ways
in vAiich subjects

were attempting to keep the deceased parent alive.
Eighty percent of the subjects made at least one
statement—

and 55% made two or more—which could be interpreted
as an attempt

to lessen the reality or finality of the death,

ihe most canmon

strategy was a new or invigorated belief in an afterlife.

As

already discussed, many of the subjects who voiced a belief
in an
afterlife did so knowing that they chose to believe this because

they found comfort in it.

Scane

this function of their belief:

subjects were quite ejqjlicit in
"I assume now I believe in [an

afterlife] more because I want it to be true for my father, because
I can't imagine him not being anything anymore, him just being
in

the ground, I can't believe that."
believe there's a life after death.

One subject said simply:

"I

If I didn't believe that,

there's no way I could feel close to my father."

Half of the subjects spoke of ways in which they have kept

their parent alive internally by continuing to hear his/her voice
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giviiig guidance, judgment,

find myself doing

v^t

ajpn^tion, or criticism.

I think they would

e.^ me to do.

do something that I think would
disappoint them."
I'm doing things for her:
this.

.

"Sometiines I
i don't

"i tell myself

I think she'd be prx^ud of me
for

Related to this, several subjects spoke
of how they use

their memory of the lost parent to motivate
them or spur them on to
accomplishment, in a sense "dedicating"
their efforts or

achievements as a tribute:

"I use her as an inspiration, because

she never gave i^, and she was sick for
five years."

Said another:

The way I resolved my mother's death. .is
that I sort of made
a deal with myself: I know that ray mother's
happiest tiine was
v*ien people said to her, "You have a
lovely family" or "You
have beautiful children," so if I can go through
life and show
people what a good person I am because of my mother,
she'll
live on throu^ me.
.

For one subject, this sense of living for her
recently deceased
father was a source of confusion:

I'm always wondering if what I'm doing, and vAmt I'm going
to
do in ray future, is for rae or for him. .right after he died,
one of the first things I said was ^I'ra going to live for
him.' I don't know if that's v*iat I'ra doing or not; sometimes
I'm not sure vdio I'ra doing things for, me or him.
.

Thirty-five percent of the subjects communicated a strong
sense of identification with the deceased parent, or spoke of
specific ways in

vMch

they are similar to him or her.

One subject

spoke of her identification with her mother as something
problematic, from v^ich she sou^t to free herself; for the others,

it appeared to be a source of comfort.

All but one of these

subjects were women, and all but one of these women were
identifying with their deceased mother (i.e., the majority of

respondents in this category were women identifying with their
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mothers)
.

it is pertiaps noteworthy that of the
13 subjec±s who

lost a father, only one seemed to be stror^ly
identified with him,

v^le

six of the nine^ subjects

viho

lost a mother either spoke

directly of, or unknowingly ooraraunicated, a
strong sense of
identification

Thirty-five percent of the subjects said that their
parent

remained alive in their hearts or memory, such as
the subject

already quoted:

"I believe my room has an afterlife because
I

remember her in my mind and my heart, and I still love
her."
Several mentioned that talking about the parent also
served this
function: "Talking about it doesn't make me feel upset,
it makes me

feel good.

It's like I'm keeping him alive."

As a final means of keeping a lost parent psychologically
alive, two subjects reported that they talk to their deceased
fathers.

One reported that she goes frequently to the cemetery to

"talk to him and tell him vtet I'm doing."

She added that "I don't

know if he can hear me, " but that it was a comfort to her.

Ihrou^ a variety of strategies,

then, many subjects sought to

minimize or soften the finality of their parents' death. It is
interesting that three of the four subjects v^o, at least from the

data of the interviews, made no attenopt to do this were also,
according to the quantitative data and a qualitative irrpression,

not strongly grieving.

Each of these four subjects reported having

a distant relationship with his or her father.

^ These figures includes the two subjects v^o lost both a
mother and a father; hence, the total is 22 deaths for 20 subjects.
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It is possible to examine this
pattern of keeping the parent
alive from different perspectives.
Psychoanalytic theories of
grief (cf . May, 1988) speak explicitly
about the role of

"inten^ization" in regard to a loss.

Freud (1917) argued that

one of the tasks of bereavement is
to intermlize the deceased
loved one in a way in which he or she
is positively identified with
the self, other psychoanalytic theorists
(e.g. Klein, 1940)

v^cm internalization is already an ongoing
and given

,

for

prxx:ess,

suggest that bereavement involves addressing
the necessary changes

to the interralized object after a real loss,

in both of these

approaches, the pAienomenon of keepirig the
deceased parent alive

involves not wantijig to relinquish a tie to the
deceased person.
In terms of understanding bereavement as a
traumatic event

that disn^ts one's basic assumptions, keeping
the deceased parent
alive may also be seen to serve an important function:

the assault on one's fundamental assunptions.

to lessen

Rather than have a

belief be vdiolly shattered or nullified, it can be elasticized,
or
acccframodated to.

By at some level mitigating the finality of the

loss (vMle not denying the factual reality of the death)

,

one's

assumptive world can largely be preserved, the structure of the

beliefs can remain in place.

A Few comments on the Question:

"Is Life Fair?"

Did the bereaved subjects believe that life is fair?

A belief

in fairness is one of the most fundamental assunptions of how we

construe the world.

(To underscore the tenacity and depth of this

belief, simply call to mind a child's ccaiplaining refrain about the
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slightest peroeived injustice in his
or her life:

-

"it's not fair!"

implying, of course, that things should
be fair)

.

a belief in

fairness involves not only a belief in
justice, but also a belief
in benevolence; linguistically, this
compound meaning is revealed
in how "fair" means both "just" and
"good."

Hence, individuals'

beliefs in fairness are usually tilted towards
vtet is positive for

the self:

v*ien

the child complains "It's not fair!," he
or she is

also saying, in part, "I deserve it."

Althou^ the question "Is life fair?" was not directly
asked
in the interview, many subjects spontaneously
commented on it, at

times providing complex and paradoxical views of their
perceptions
of fairness.

What frequently emerged was an understanding of

fairness in terms of relative personal benefit:

^en

good things

are happening to you, life is fair; v^en bad things are happening,
it's not fair.

Hence, many subjects said that immediately after

the bereavement they began to feel that life was unfair, but they
regained a sense of fairness once they began to recover from the
immediate distress of the loss.

A few subjects reported that they continued to believe

that

life was unfair, and that their previous beliefs in fairness had

been illusory.

Others maintained that life was still fair, but

that they (or their parent) had e5^)erienced bad luck.

By

attributing the event to unluckiness, they could still maintain a
fundamental belief in the fairness of the world.

One subject commented on how the concept of fairness was no
longer meaningful.

It's not that things were either fair or

unfair; things just were.

She said:
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Is life fair? No.
(Pause)
Yes.
(Pause)
it's fair in a
bad way
Bad thii^s happen to v^nderful picple,
LfSiSs^
happen to the worst pecple in the world,
a
.

.

S^Sion

seer.

girS^f'?

at It in terms of fair or unfair.

juvSiL'tr^S

Perhaps the most paradoxical attitudes
towards fairness and
justice were demonstrated by a woman v^o
had recently lost both her

mother and step-father of many years,

ihis subject was a devout

Christian v^ose main focus in life, in part
due to her mother's
death, was Christian ministry.

Althou^ she ascribed meaning to

the deaths of both her mother and her step-father,
the meanings

were contradictory and reached via totally different
paths.

Her mother, also a devout Christian, died because
"God. .was
.

doing it for a reason, he was in control. .He knows
.

v*iat

he's

doing, and ultimately, he causes all things to work
together for

the good."

Her step-father, however, was not Christian, and at

first she said that "for [him]
happened. "

,

I can't figure out v*iy it

She then went on, however, to attribute his death to

reasons different from those relevant to her mother:

cancer was a result of stress and feelings:

I

"I think his

think he felt very

guilty about how he left my mother and it was really eating at him,

and that's

vdiat

killed him, that's v^y he got cancer."

She stated

that his death was also somehow related to the fact that "he wasn't
Christian."

This statement was in contrast to her previous

assertions that her mother's death was best understood specifically

because of her Qiristianity.

For this subject, the need to make sense of and ascribe

meaning to her losses was apparent.
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What united these two

divergent explanations «as the fact
that sane ej^planation, in and
Of itself, was required.
Additionally, this example shows the
paradoxical and self-

enhancing ways in

vMch

beliefs in fairness may function:

the

mother's death was seen as reward, the
step-father's death as
punishment or justice.

The step-father somehow deserved to die,

the mother earned the privilege.

The "fairness" of the deaths

became a secondary matter, as did a coherent and
logically sound
belief system; each was less iiiportant than the need
to find a
sufficient meaning and to thus maintain a framework
for

understanding the world.

This diapter was included to provide an overview of the
impact
of bereavement on the assumptive beliefs of these subjects,
as they
presented it in a semi-structured clinical interview.

The

discussions of how the subjects ascribed meaning to the death, how

they felt it changed them interpersonally and intrapsychically, and

how it affected their beliefs about life, the world, religion and
an afterlife, all speak to changed assumptions.

Given the wealth

and diversity of responses, it is clear that the ej^jerience of
bereavement had significant, and at times profound, effects on some

of the most fundamental beliefs by which these individuals ascribed
meaning to their worlds.
Given this general overview of the territory, it now becomes
possible to looks more closely at how various beliefs relate to one
another, and how changes in assuirptive beliefs affected specific

individuals.

The following chapter discusses in detail the
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assumptive worlds of four individuals,
and

my

shed some li<^t on

how these beliefs function in the context
of specific lives.
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CHAPTER XI

ANALYSIS OF QUAUTATIVE DATA IIHOW SUBJECTS ASCRIBED MEANING:
CASE STUDIES

As already detailed, there was
oonsiderBble variability in
subjects' responses to how they ascribed
meaning to the world.

This variability was evident on the Meaning
scale of the World

Assumption Scale and in the clinical interviews.

Additionally,

there was a striJcing relationship between
the amount of unresolved
grief, as measured by the Texas Grief Inventory,
and meaning-

related beliefs, with the "low grievers" typically
scoring high on

beliefs in justice and control, and the "high
grievers" more
frequently believing instead in randomness or chance.

This inverse

relationship between the two measures was also reflected
in a more
subjective impression, derived from interview data.'^

Were there systematic similarities and differences in the
subjects who scored high on meaning vs. those who scored low,
in

addition to how they ascribed meaning to the world?

In this

chapter, I will present a more comprehensive, clinically-oriented

view of four subjects.

Two of these subjects scored high on

A ranking of the subjects' grief and meaning-related
beliefs, based on qualitative data from the interview, produced a
ranking quite similar to that of the quantitative measures. There
were, however, a few exceptions. On the subjective (interviewbased) grief measure, I underestimated the grief score of one
subject and overestimated it for two. The two subjects vtiose
amount of grief I "overestimated," in the sense that they scored
low on the TGI, both presented as depressed and greatly disturbed
by the loss. Interestingly, despite their low grief scores on the
TGI, they also scored low on meaning, vy*iich was a break from the
usual pattern of 1cm grief, hi*^ meaning, or vice versa. The one
subject v^ose meaning score I most dramatically erred in estimating
was also an exception to the usual pattern, scoring both high on
grief and hi^ on meaning.
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meanii^ and lew on grief, with their
tereavenent causing apparently
little disn^ion to their conceptual
systems.

Conversely, the

other two are subjects who scored la.
on meaning and high on grief,
i.e. subjects for v*iam the bereavement
was a greatly disrupting
event in how they ascribed meaning to the
world.

These four

subjects have been selected because they
are representative of the
most common pattern found in the data, i.e.
an inverse relationship

between intensity of grief and an ability to
maintain meaningful
sense of the world.

These vignettes may shed light on what is

associated with these differing conceptual frameworks,
and

viiy

the

loss affected the conceptual systems of some subjects
so strongly,

and others so minimally.

While representative, these case presentations are not meant
to inflexibly portray the entire population; not every subject
fit
into the predominant pattern.

A small minority of subjects did not

fit this pattern at all, demonstrating either a

hi^

level of grief

and a continued strong ability to believe in justice and control,

or a small amount of grief with greatly disnapted beliefs in
meaning.

Nonetheless, the general pattern of high meaning/low

grief or low meaning/high grief was the rule to which there were
few exceptions.

The cases discussed here, all exemplative of the

typical pattern, were chosen because they most clearly demonstrate

these two differing responses to bereavement (hic^ meaning/low

^ The subject with the hi^est score on the Meaning scale of
the WAS was the one subject v^o participated in the quantitative
section of the study, but then chose not to continue with the
interview. While this is an intriguing datum, by its nature it
does not lend itself very well to scrutiny or speculation.
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grief or lav ineaning/high grief)

.

highlight the differences

between the two, the cases were
selected from the
data, and it

my

extr^

of the

thus be inferred that the majority
of subjects

displayed a siinilar pattern to a less
pronounced degr^.

Subjects For Whom thej Death
Case

1:

Miciiael

H;^d

Little Tmp^^H-

Michael was the subject who scored
highest on

the Meaning scale of the WAS, and lowest
on the TCI.

He was also

among the lowest scorers on the self-report
SCIr-90-R, indicating that
he perceived himself to be experiencing
minimal psychological
distress.

At the time of the interview, he was a 20 year
old junior

at the university.

His father had died, at the age of 59, ten
months

before.

Michael reported that his father had had a long history
of

hypertension and strokes, and Michael had "acclimated
to seeing him
sick."

Michael emphasized several times that his primary response
to

his father's death was "relief...! didn't see my father's
death as a
reason for sadness, but rather for relief, an end to his
suffering."

He said that he had never asked himself why this had happened to
his
father:
I accepted it at its face value.
My mother couldn't understand
why such a good man would be taken, but I never looked at it
that way. There's a time for everyone to die, good or bad...
didn't feel like I had gotten the short end of the stick by
losing my father \4ien I was a young man.

Michael had a strong belief in Catholicism, a belief which had not

been affected by the death, and, in general, his "attitudes about
living and about death have remained relatively unaffected."
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In the interview, Michael spoke
intelligently and articulately

about his reactions.

However, most striJcing in his
presentation

was the profound lack of emotion in his
responses.

He spoke

forcefully and earnestly, but with a voice
devoid of emotional
inflection, and with responses lacking emotional
content.

Invariably, he deflected questions calling for
emotional responses

by saying

'-My

mother feels..." or "my sister feels...", or he
would

instead offer details of his father's illness.

Michael stated that the death "upset" him, but that he
quickly
recovered from this feeling of upset.

Somevtot defensively, he

e3q)lained that grief is "very different for each person,
and

different people adjust differently."

He reiterated frequently how

the death had not been difficult for him and how he had already

passed being

i:?)set

by it.

It was particularly dramatic and

surprising, then, when he suddenly began shaking with sobs and

found hiinself momentarily unable to continue with the interview

because he was crying too deeply.

The incident which led to this pronounced but brief shattering
of his defenses is instructive in terms of how Michael maintains
his sense of meaning in the world.

He was talking about visiting

his father in the hospital:
The thing that was most li^jsetting to me was going into the
hospital one ni^t. My father was in a coma, and I just stood
in the doorway and watched him.
(Begins crying strongly)
He
was struggling very hard to breathe, and that was very
i:^)setting.
I found it hard to watch. .that was the most
difficult thing for me, watching him fight so hard.
.

.

I later asked Michael v^iat was so difficult emotionally about

that incident.

He answered:
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Seeing him fightijng so haid a losing
cause.
It was UDsettinci
tan fighting so hard to
«hen 1

to^

^ive

kn^h?^^

He then added:
I'm a person who feels I'm in control of
my destiny and thincfs
I want^ Things I want to have
happen I ca?i have a iS^of^
in, and It had gotten beyond that
point for him. He was no
and I felt badly that thirds had
^
taken

'^of

^

Ss^!

Michael's brief breakdown of defenses was not
triggered by a
sense of loss; it was the fear of losing control,
or, more
precisely, a brief, fri^tening recognition that
not everything can

be controlled—a severe threat to one of the central
assumptive
tenets of his life.

Above all else, Michael is a man v^o needs to

maintain a belief in his control over every aspect of
his life.

The need to perpetuate this belief included conceptualizing
his
father's death as a relief and as a part of the expected
plan of
things, rather than as a disrupting loss.

He revealed the

investment he has in not having his assumptive beliefs about
control, or meaning, disrupted:
I think, looking back on it, that his death was not as
traumatic as it seemed then. Seeing him for two weeks
fighting very hard to survive was very traumatic, but. .v*ien I
look at it now, I see the fight he put up against his illness
as an extension of his character. So the trauma of it is much
less now than it was then; the distance has helped me put it
into perspective.
.

To help maintain his strong belief in absolute personal
control, Michael reinterpreted a traumatic event

father struggle in vain to breathe
father's] character."

—as

—^watching his

an "extension of [his

By doing so, the trauma no longer becomes a

threat to his belief in control. Rather than allow that
uncontrollable events happen, Michael ei^lained the event in a way
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^*

»axlaized persoml control and
kept a sense of powerlessness,
or lack Of control, far fr«»
conscicxasness. Micteel was
determnel
not to have his belief in control
shattered, for it is central
to hov,
he understands the world and his
life.

-^^^^

Jane was

anl8 year old

freshman whose father had

died of a heart attack 27 months prior
to the interview,

she scored
high on the WAS Meaning scale (her rank
was third), and she was the
second lowest scorer on the Present
Grief measure of the TCI (Michael

was the lowest)

R

.

m contrast to Michael,

she had an elevated SCI^90-

score, suggesting some degree of
psychological difficulty,

she

presented in the interview with a flat and
somev^t depressed affect,

and had a harder time than most subjects with
questions reganiing
self-reflection or insist.

From her own reports, any possible current depression
was not

due to the loss of her father, for this had had only
a minor
on her.

iitpact

After his death, she felt "sad for about three months,"
but

then "a lot of things started happening:
boyfriend, stuff lite that."

was also inportant to her.

the prom, I got a

Realizing that "the family could go on"
She acknowledged that she "probably

didn't think about it as much as other pecple in similar situations."
Like Michael, she was somev^iat defensive about her muted grief
response.

Jane's father's death did not disn4)t her beliefs about the
orderliness and justice of life.

After he died she asked herself

"why him," but had a ready answer:
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"He didn't take good care of the

himself.

He was overweight.

smoked."

I persevered with

He had the odds against him.

tMs

He

line of questioning, only to
find

this belief was strong for her:
Interviewer: So in answer to the question
^Why him ' would
you answer that it was because he didn't
take Lre if ISJself?

^ttri^te it to that, but I do wonder v*iy,
But still. It wasn't like (snaps her
fimers) h4 was
in great shape and then he died.

l^'r./
kind of

^

Jane also had a deterministic attitude about
matters of life
and death,

v^ch

remained unaltered by her bereavement:

number's i^, it's up."

"When your

she did not consider herself religious and

did not feel that the death had any impact on any
of her beliefs or
attitudes about life.

Jane did not appear to have much access to her inner
world or

to the emotional worlds and responses of others.

When I asked her

hcM she thou^t her mother had reacted, emotionally, to the
loss,
she answered:

"I can't even imagine.

talk about our feelings."

We [in

ray

family] just don't

It is important to note that Jane did

not perceive her lack of emotional vitality to be a problem, at
least at this point in her life.

Jane's interview was noteworthy for the great distance and
lack of attachment she ejqjressed regarding her father, in his life

and his death.

Underneath her flat affect, occasional glinpses of

anger and bitterness towards him would show through.
negative aspects of their relationship:
close.

.

She hinted at

"We weren't really

.He wasn't the kind of father v*io you'd go to with your

problems. . .it wasn't like he used to do a lot of things for me.

didn't do a lot of things for me."
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At one point, she said:

He

"If I

«ere closer to hm. I'm sure it would
have done a lot more to me
than it did."
However, contrary to theories which
postulate that ambivalent

personal relationships lead to pathological
grief reactions (e.g.
Freud, 1917; Click, et al., 1974), these
unvoiced feelings did not

appear to be prolonging Jane's grief.

Jane did not appear to be

grieving, or to have grieved, but this lack
of emotional

functioning likely predated, and siperx:eded, her
loss.

In fact,

the sense I got was that the unspoken (but not
necessarily
conflicted) reality for Jane was that her father's
death was a

relief to her.

From the minimal interview data, it is conceivable

that their relationship was significantly more estranged
and
problematic than she alluded to.

For Jane, the world is a just place.

She believes that people

get v*iat they deserve and that misfortune is least likely to strike
worthy, decent people.

The tenacity of this belief was apparent in

how she attributed her father's death to his lack of taking care of
himself, as if he somehow deserved vdiat he got.

Conceivably, at

the level of her assumptive beliefs, Jane believed that her father
did deserve to die.

They were not close, he was not a good father,

and she always perceived herself as independent.

Rather than these thoughts causing a conflict and resulting in
a pronounced grieving response, as they would with some other
people, Jane's history of blunted emotional functioning predisposed

her to having no grief response, or a minimal one.

She interpreted

the death in a way vdiich was consonant with, and even reinforcing
of, her belief in justice.

Cood people get
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vihat

they deserve, her

father was not a good person,

arxi

so it made sense that he got

v^t

he did.

Jane did not want to acknowledge
any potential threat to
this belief system, or to admit the
possibility of unresolved pain
regarding her ambivalent relationship
with her father and his loss.
She preferred to keep this all away fram
conscious scrutiny, and
she protected herself with a willful
denial:

long ago.

"[His death] seems so

it's one of those things that you put
behind you."

Jane and Michael had several similarities in
their responses

to the death and in how they made sense of the
world.

Neither

regarded the loss as an event of significant emotional
impact
(neither actually regarded the death primarily as
a "loss")

Neither had an expressive emotional style.

Both used denial and

rationalization to defensively maintain their beliefs in justice

and control.

Both reported conflicted or distant relationships

with their fathers; significantly, neither said anything

v*iich is

suggestive of a need or desire to keep their deceased father
alive.

From the case discussions of these two subjects, it seems
that having a distant relationship with the deceased parent may
have been a significant factor in the low grief and high meaning
pattern v^iich they di^layed. However, there are two items of
relevant data suggesting that this pattern may not be
generalizable. First, all subjects were asked to report, on a five
point scale, how close their relationship was with the deceased
parent in the two years prior to the death. This measure did not
correlate strongly with either the grief or meaning measures.
Second, other subjects with a similar response profile of Michael
and and Jane did report having had a close relationship with their
lost parent. Therefore, v*iile the distant relationships both
report are important in understanding their particular cases, there
does not appear to be strong support for the notion that a distant
relationship, in and of itself, will minimize disruption of an
individual's assumptive beliefs.
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Both Jane and Michael were individuals
whose need to maintain
their assumptions about meaning took
pr^ence over, and shaped
their interpretations of, the deaths.
The question arises, of
course, v^ether they were cxping well or
were, instead, subsumed in

pathological denial.

On the one hand, the defensive

arroor of

Michael and Jane was extremely protective of
any possible assault

to their basic beliefs, and both denied any sense
of loss or pain.
On the other hand, at least Michael, the more
articulate and
insightful of the two, appeared to be functioning
well in his life

and was aware of his controlled personality.

He reported he has

close friends, a girlfriend, and greatly values intiinacy
in his
life.

He does well scholastically and acts responsibly upon
his

sense of concern about his mother.

He was able to reflect on his

lack of emotionality, and, v^ile somev»tet defensive about it,

maintained that this is how he best functions.
By the guidelines of any traditional stage model, Jane and

Michael have not really grieved.

Yet Michael maintained he is

coping and functioning well, and there was little in his
presentation to suggest otherwise.

For him, coping well meant

maintaining an intact belief in control, and this belief allows him

to function productively and find meaning in his life.
In a qualified sense, Jane, too, couJ.d be said to be coping
well.

The qualification is that Jane's lack of connection to her

emotional life seemed more pronounced, and more pathological, than
it did for Michael; within this context, however, Jane was coping

well with the specific event of the death.

She had mastered it in

a way in v^ich it did not further impede her ability to function in
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the «orld.

For Jane to nate

that laws Of justice prevail.

^

of events, she needed to believe

Ey understanding her father's
death

m

a way which was concordant with
this belief, she mairtained
the
conceptual system which allowed her
to make sense of the world
around
her.

Subjects For Whom the PPath Had significant Tmp^H-

Case

Shamn Sharon was a 21 year old senior at
the

3:

our interview.

tiine

of

Her 55 year old father, who had died of
pancreatic

cancer seven months before, had first been
diagnosed three months

prior to his death.
Sharon presented as an extremely verbal and
emotionally
expressive young woman.
responses:

There was a large range to her emotional

she frequently cried, expressed anger, and also
spoke

emphatically of her gratitude towards some of her friends.

She had a

dramatic, flamboyant verbal style and spoke of things,
such as the

details of the disease, in vivid detail.

Ihis style of extreme

response was reflected in the quantitative measures:

Sharon was the

lowest scorer on the Meaning scale of the WAS and the highest scorer

on the Present Grief and Total Grief measures of the TGI.

She was

the second highest scorer on the SCL-90-R, indicating a great deal of
self-perceived psychological distress.

Sharon was greatly affected by her father's death.

amazing

Vs*iat

"It's

something like this can do to you," she reported, and

then gave many indications throughout the interview of how true this

was for her.

She said she thinks and talks about the death
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"all the tinie."

to die.

she has "fearful dreams" that her
mother is going

She feels she's "weaker emotionally"
and doesn't trust

people anymore.

Althou^ she used to be religious, she
started to

"hate God" because "he took him in the
worst way. .if it was
.

something like a heart attack, that would
have been easier."

she

advised other people in her situation:

This is how it goes usually. You'll be okay
for a \Aiile
you'll cry every now and then, but you'll be
just fine 'And
then It will hit you like a ton of bricks. You'll
probablv
^ be
devastated.

The death shook many of Sharon's fundamental beliefs
about
life and death.

She came to believe that "everything is based on

luck, on chance," and added that she "hadn't

thou^t about [these

topics] beforehand, and, even if I did, I probably wouldn't

remember, because this has had such an impact on me."

She used the

phrase "unbelievably unfair" to describe both her father's death
and her current attitude about life.

She couldn't understood

it happened, but asked herself this question everyday.

v*iy

She felt

corrpelled to find an answer, and was frustrated because she

believed she never would.
Sharon's assunptive beliefs were shattered by her bereavement.

Her old beliefs were no longer capable of making sense of the
world, but she had not yet found different beliefs to replace them.

This conceptual struggle was symbolically encapsulated in Sharon's
descriptions of vdiat she thou^t about when she remembered her
father:

At first [shortly after his death] I would only be able to
see him like v^en he was very sick. He weighed 118 pounds, he
was very regressed. Right when he died, he opened his eyes
and looked at each and every one of us. .and when I used to
,

.

93

think about him

that's what I would see, that
face

^^^^y
tije

^

last breath that he took.

living

is.

I wishT?

had

I

i thirfc

SSqht a^S^

nev^^

Recently, however, this graphic and
traumatic image had been

replaced by memories of her father when she
was a young girl:
Now, I think of pictures, moments back
when we were living on
Street. Life was so simple then. I think
about
the times we shared at the old house.

———

For Sharon, the vivid image of her deteriorating,
dying father
captured, in microcosm, the trauma of his death.

This image, so

disturbing to her, was replaced—a symbolic enactment
of her desire

to minimize, ignore, or fend off the trauma—by a
more gentle and
nostaligic image of her life as a young girl.

By doing so, she was

attempting to recapture and reinvigorate her old understanding
of

the world by focusing on an idealized past.

was no longer viable.

However, this model

She could not return to her old beliefs

because they were no longer functional.

One way of understanding

the pain of her loss is that, conceptually, she had no place to go:

her old beliefs were outdated, and there was no new framework to
take its place.

The question arises as to why Sharon was having so much
difficulty relinquishing her old beliefs.

One answer, in this

case, lay in her unresolved feelings towards her father.

She could

not return to her former beliefs not only because they were no
longer viable, but because she had been left with strongly

ambivalent feelings about her relationship with him:

To this day, it bothers me that he once said: "I'm really
proud of you, you remind me of your sister, Marilyn." And I
thou<^t, ^No, I want to get credit for being me. ' To this
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enough for

hm, that

I

isn't

thTlaS^hf^LTS

to^S^

L^TtiiL-?;^^a.^s'har^t*^kTi4?-^
Sharon could not leave her old
beliefs behind and start
reconstnicting a ineaningful view of the
world because she was hopir^
to seek solace in her old assunptions.
she wanted to find within
them the love, security and meaning
vAiich she felt she had lost.
However, she was caught betwixt and
between, and therein lay the

source of the pain:

she had no new framework, and her old
framework

could not provide comfort because she
could not fully believe in
that, either.

Her memories of early, good times were an
attempt to

hold on to an idealized past, but her actual
past she viewed as more
conflicted and ambiguous,

she had no new framework, and her old

framework was not only faulty now, but perhaps was
faulty to begin
with.

She could neither embrace the past nor reject
it, she could

move neither forward nor back, and so she remained stuck,
amazed "at
what something like this can do to you."

—Kathy

^^^^ ^'

Kathy was an ei^teen year old freshman.

On the

quantitative measures, she scored relatively low on Meaning and

on Total Grief and Present Grief.

hi^

In the interview, she presented as

having found an appropriate balance between emotionally acknowledging

the reality of the loss and continuing to function well and adapt to
college; however, her SCL-90-R score was the highest among the
subjects, indicating a broad scope of self-perceived distress.
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Six months prior to our interview,
Kathy's 43 year old father
was killed in a commercial plane crash.
She reported, in simple

but harrowing detail, learmng about the
crash and waiting for
information:
First, we heard on TV that there was
a plane crash
We
weren't even sure if he was really on that
flight.' We had no
clue, no one called or anything
.at first, we heard that
there were survivors, then they told us there
weren't any. We
didn t know anything for a couple of days, until
they had a
list of passengers and they had his name on
it.
Five days
later, they identified him by his dental records
or
A lot of waiting—that was the worst part, trying tosomethinq
hold on
to hope—hope that he somehow got off the plane,
or that he
didn't get a ticket.
. .

Although the parents of several subjects died unejqjectedly,
Kathy was the only subject whose bereavement was due to
such a
cataclysmic accident. 1°

She spoke often of her sense of disbelief:

You never think something like this is going to happen to you.
It's always to the other person. You see it on TV, but it's
people that you'll never meet, never know. It's a shock when
something happens. .It's one thing v^ien it's death by old age,
but it's hard to believe that so many things could happen,
that anything could happen tomorrow. I don't think you can
really control what's happening.
.

Unlike Sharon, Kathy 's demeanor was taciturn and subdued.

She

presented as being ^thick-skinned' and did not have an emotionally
expressive presentation.

While very responsive to

ray

questions,

her stance in the interview was somevtot emotionally detached;
however, much of vdiat she said indicated a great sense of

One other subject ejqjerienced a bereavement that had a
dramatic precipitant. She lost both her mother and father, in
unrelated incidents, within three years of each other. Her mother
fell down a flight of stairs in the family's home and died the next
day of ccmplications related to the fall. Her father died suddenly
of a hecirt attack. She too, scored extremely low on the Meaning
scale of the WAS.
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confusion, and even bewilderment,
about how to nake sense of
things.

Kathy appeared to have lost some of her
identity in her
father's death.

She spoke of the close relationship
they had, and

how important it was for her to please him:
One of the best feelings was v*ien I knew he
was proud of
.1 feel like I have to make him proud of me,
even now.
It's stronger now than before he died.

me.

.

However, this sense of identification with him
was both

motivating and a source of confusion:

He was an accountant, I'm thinking of becoming an
accountant. .I'm always wondering if what I'm doing,
and vtot
I'm going to do in my future, is for me or for him.
Ri<^t
after he died, one of the first things I said was "I'm
going
to live for him." I don't know if that's v*iat I'm doing or
not. Sometimes I'm not sure v*io I'm doing things for
me or
.

him.

Kathy was also confused about v^iether she was mourning
"properly" or not, and talked about her grief process with

defensive qualifications:
I feel guilty about not going to temple everyday, but I've
talked to friends v*io have said ^You're mourning in your own
way, ' and even thou^ sometimes now I feel guilty about going
out and having a good time, I am mourning, and no one can tell
me I'm not.

And in terms of how to make sense of the world, Kathy 's
beliefs had undergone tremendous upheaval.

Kathy 's beliefs in fate

and chance, her realization that "so many things could happen" were
new:

"I never thought about it before because it wasn't there to

think about."

The fact that something did happen, that it was her

family and not scaneone on TV, shattered Kathy 's beliefs in safety,
invulnerability, and meaning.
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interestingly, though, part of
Kathy's confusion was that, in
fact, she had not abandoned these
beliefs to the degr^ that she
thought made cognitive sense:

^

^^^^
happen to me, but
^t^^ii^^""^
It s not as strong; I don't know why
I still have it at
"^^^^ changed my beliefs. You miqht
: -iH^

thir^ right after it happens "I don't
believe anymor^; "
think If yc^ believed something all along,
it's not giing to
all of a sudden change what you believed.

brf

For Kathy, the confusion was how to continue
holding beliefs

~

such as a belief in justice, that pecple get
what they deserve

that she had learned weren't necessarily true.

-

Cognitively, she

saw the belief as sham, yet she was acknowledging
that on some
deeper level she needed to be able to retuni to
it.

Ihe struggle

for her was v^ether she could allow herself to return
to the old
beliefs, which had been proven invalid, but which
nonetheless

continued to provide necessary, if illusory, guidelines for
how to
ascribe meaning to the world.

In her non-elaborative style, Kathy summed up her willingness

to maintain the paradoxes that she now believed

in, such as

maintaining beliefs that she knew not to be true and consciously
choosing to believe in an afterlife because she found comfort in
it:

People have lots of different ways of coping. There's no
ri<^t way. If the way you cope doesn't hurt you... well, you
have to get on with your life.
It is as if Kathy, v^iose most fundamental assunptions about

life had been disrupted by a dramatic, random event, was engaged in
a process of damage-control.

She was attenpting to salvage v*iat
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she cxxad free her faulty,

mi^t

t..t

nuch needed, world view, so
that she

continue to believe in something.

Cc«npared with Jane and Michael,
the assumptive worlds of

Sharon and Kathy had been seriously
assaulted by the trauma of
their parents' death. In fact, the word
trauma, as it is commonly
used, did not seem applicable to the
event of the death for Michael

and Jane, but it did for Kathy and Sharon,
iitpact of the event

in Sharon's case, the

may be understood by several factors:

the

relative une^q^ectedness of the event, a
conflicted and unresolved
relationship with her father, and an
emotionally-charged style of

dealing with the world.

For Kathy, the cataclysmic, fatal accident

was an event of such magnitude that it boldly
robbed her of the
belief that bad things don't happen.
Both were struggling, without success, to maintain
old
beliefs.

Each needed to find new ways to make sense of the world.

For Kathy, this

mi^t mean

reconciling the discrepancy between her

need to believe in a sense of personal invulnerability and
the fact
that such a belief may be functional, but false.

For Sharon, the

issue is how to loosen the grip of her old beliefs, or how to

resolve the tension of wishing to return to an old belief system-

one in v^iich things made sense and she felt secure and loved
in fact she never fully had.

—that

Sharon did not want to return to the

ways things were; she wanted to return to the way she wished things
were.

Until she can address the difference between these two, she

will be cau^t with nothing substantial to believe in.
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Ihese case studies begin to
partially illustrate
analysis of the interview data reveals:

v^t

a fuller

in an individual suffering

from a trauma, it is not inherently
good or bad, healthy or
pathological, to maintain or discard an
extant belief system.

least one additional cofactor is also
relevant:

At

v^ether the old

assumptive beliefs are being maintained
defensively, in a
dysfunctional way; or, conversely, whether new
beliefs represent a
inodified framework for understanding the
world, or the lack of a

framework.

In other words, to approach the same issue
from another angle,
respondents can be divided into four categories:

1)

individuals

v^o, after the trauma, maintained their old
beliefs in a way

was iiipeding psychological health;

2)

vMch

individuals v^o maintained

their old beliefs in a way v^ich facilitated psychological
health;
3)

individuals vAiose beliefs had been changed, but

\Aio

found

themselves lost and bereft of a necessary schema with which to
function; and

beliefs, but

4)

v*io

individuals for v*icm the bereavement changed their

had adapted well and found meaning in new ones.H

Concepts such as "psychological health" are, of course,
complex and multi-faceted. Additionally, this cursory
categorization belies some difficult questions: When is denial a
valuable tool for survival or, conversely, an iirpediment to growth
and a defensive distortion of reality? What is, in fact, an
"appropriate" response to grief or trauma: to be symptomatic or
asynptomatic, to have your beliefs radicalized or to have them
remain static? These valuable questions are beyond the scope of
this work. However, if one were to use the SCL-90 as a rudimentary
measure of psychological distress, the quatemate categorization
discussed above is valid with this sarople of subjects. SCL-90
scores did not significantly correlate with the belief measures of
the WAS, indicating that beliefs in randomness, justice and control
were independent of self-perceived psychological distress.
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Among this saitple of bereaved
individuals, there were subjects
in
each of these categories.
The interviews suggest that at least four
potential factors

may be involved in dictating what kind of

iinpact a close death will

have on an individual's assumptive world:

the degree of perceived

loss, the manner of the death, the degree
to which the relationship

with the parent was ambivalent, and per^nality-r^lated
factors
such as ego-strength, emotional lability, and
coping style.
Additionally, factors such as social support and
modified external

realities (such as sudden financial changes, or new
role

responsibilities within a family)

,

while less relevant to the

present study, will likely also affect assumptive changes,

ihe

above factors will interact in such a way that may be seen
as

additive (or multiplicative)

;

thus, for example, Michael's robust

sense of self-control may not have survived intact if his father

had not had a long history of illness, or Kathy's high level of
self-reported psychological distress might not have been so extreme

had the death been less dramatically sudden.

Whether, and how,

beliefs change is not a simple question, and likely involves a
conplex relationship between intrapsychic factors, the degree of

the assault, and the actual facts and context of a person's life.

In summary, this chapter looked at the assunptive worlds of

four bereaved individuals, and the ways in v*iich their experiences

affected how they ascribed meaning to the world.

For two of the

individuals, their bereavement caused only minor disruption to

their beliefs; in contrast, the assunptive worlds of the other two
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were greatly shaken.

While they do not fit in with
traditional

stage models of grief, the cases
of Michael and Jane

exerplative of one of the grievii^
cat^ories

and Silver (in press)

:

individuals

immediate or subsequent distress.

v*io

my

be

prx^ by Worbran

r^ct to

loss with little

Sharon and Kathy, on the other

hand, are suffering from the loss of
their basic assumptions-their

reality formation-as well as their loss
in reality.

For them, the

tasks of bereavement are different, and
involve regainiiig, or
reforming, a network of beliefs by vfeLch they
can make sense of the
world.
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CHAPTER XII

ANALYSIS OF QUAUTATIVE DATA III:
SOyiE CX3NCIUDING CX3MMENTS

At the outset of the study, a possible
concern was that it
would be difficult to find subjects vAio
met the simple, but
demanding, criteria of having recently lost
a parent and felt

willing to talk about it.

This proved not to be difficult at all.

Althou<^ they were not all included in the
analyses, for reasons
previously e^qslained, 27 subjects were interviewed,
and a few
others volunteered but were deemed inappropriate
for various
reasons.

Why did so many people choose to participate?

When this question was asked in the interview, several
answers
emerged repeatedly.

People felt that they had learned something

from their ej^jerience and wanted to share it with others.

way to give back some of

v^t

It was a

they felt they had received.

Some

subjects thou^t that finding other subjects would be difficult,

and so they volunteered because they knew they fit the bill.

Some

stated sijiply that they wanted the opportunity to re-examine their

own grieving process, to see where they were compared to the last
time they had seriously considered it.

Several subjects pointed

out that they welcomed, but were rarely afforded, opportunities to

talk about their loss, given that the omnipresent social support
immediately following the death dwindled dramatically in the
following months and years.

There were, I believe, at least two additional forces at work.
First, everyone viho participated was, in his or her own way, an
ejqjert on grief.

More often than not, there is nothing in a
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person's prior history that has
pr^par^i him or her for the
intensity, nature, and duration
of the emotions that acconpany
bereavement. Society at large
provides no guidance; images
of

death or mourning in the media
minimize the traumatic potential
of
the event, and the culture perpetuates
the notion that death and
dying are taboo subjects. To go thrxxigh
the experience of
bereavement is a

hi^y

personal education.

facilitative effect of social support, it

Despite the important

r^ins

a solitary

journey to accept vtot must be accepted,
to work through

be worked through.

viiat

must

There is a sense of pride and of
accomplishment

that accompany coping well or having successfully
mastered a
traumatic event, and subjects wished to display,
and share, the
ejq^ertise they had gained, in the only way by
which it may be

gained.

Related to this, however, is the fact that grief is
isolating.
It is not without trepidation that individuals embark
on the path

of grief by themselves, with no one to tell them if they
are doing
it correctly.

This unspoken subtext—am I grieving correctly?--

emerged repeatedly as a concern of many subjects, and was, I
believe, one of the reasons they chose to participate.

Subjects

who were coping well, subjects who apparently were not— regarxiless,
there was a continual wondering if they wer^ handling their

mourning correctly, if they were all right, if they were acting
appropriately.

Several subjects spoke of their coping strategies,

or of their behaviors since the death, in defensive terms:

"I am

mourning, and no one can tell me I'm not mourning. .1 think people
.

believe in vtotever they want to believe in."
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For many subjects,

the iirtervia, «as a

r^ity

test, to ctetermine if
«hat they had

been workir^ on in isolation

with the approval of a
researcher

in the field.

Ihe data

frc«n

this study si^port Wortman and
Silver's (1987;

in press) cx^ntention that grief is
a nailti-faoeted phenomenon
v^ich
does not lend itself easily to a single,
monolithic theoretical
understanding,

m terms of the duration of grief,

it seems that

several of the individuals completed the
bulk of their grievii^

process within a few months after the
loss.

Hence, the suggestion

that grief is of a fixed duration, and
optimally a phenomenon
lasting one to two years, was not substantiated
by this population.

And in terms of the emotional reactions to
loss, not all the
bereaved subjects expressed anger, and not
all even expressed
sadness.

As such, the notion of "appropriate" grief consisting
of

a prescribed emotional path was also not substantiated.

Conducting 27 interviews with bereaved individuals was
a

humbling experience.

I was continually impressed by the resilience

and wisdom of the subjects, the honesty with VyMch many had
addressed their loss, the tremendously renewed sense of meaning
some had been able to bring to their lives, and the ability of most

to face adversity and emerge, if not unscathed, in much stronger
shape than they themselves might have predicted.

Averill and Nunley (1988) argue that grief has increasingly

come to be seen as a psychological phenomenon requiring the
involvement of the mental health profession.

Certainly, bereaved

individuals might seek out, and benefit from, psychotherapeutic

intervention for numerous reasons.
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However, the present study

suggests that many bereaved
irxiivicbals a.^ capable of
addressii^
the difficulties of loss in the
context of their own lives,

erployi^ useful and creative expiry

roechanisir^

ability to function in a changed
world.
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to mintain their
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oo^cmsiQN

in their introduction to a

r«^t

collection of papers on

bereavement, Stroebe, stroebe i
Kansson (1988) b^in:

upev,

people
escape the tragedy of losing a
loved f«r^n someti^ duri:^
their
lives, and «hen it
the world changes" (p.i)
ihe present
study «as an attetpt to learn hew,
fr™ a specific vantage point,

haR^

.

the world does indeed change.
The prinicipal theoretical assumption
underlying this study
was that bereavement, like other
potential
traumas, disrupts some

of the most basic and profound
assumptions by which individuals
structure their world and self views.

It was hypothesized that the

beliefs most susceptible to disruption
would be those related to

how individuals ascribe meanir^ to their
lives.
vdio

Would individuals

had been bereaved be able to maintain their
beliefs that life

was just and controllable, that events did not
happen randomly or

by chance, that if they were decent people, misfortune
would avert
them?

The data from the present study indicate that, in fact,
these
beliefs can be greatly disn?)ted by bereavement.

The bereaved

individuals in this study were less able to ascribe meaning to the

world than their non-bereaved peers, and were more likely to
attribute events to chance rather than to principles of justice or
control.

The bereaved individuals had not only lost a parent; they

were also bereft of the beliefs by which they had previously made
sense of the world.
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Miile as a group the bereavoi
individuals wer^ less able
to
maintain their beliefs in ir^ani^,
not all the subjects lost
or
abandoned these beliefs.

Ihe finding that the loss
of r^eanii^ was

strongly associated with the
degree of grief has important
ramifications for our growing
understandii^ of grief
individual s
.

v^o were grieving less were those
v^o were able to maintain,
or
redefine (but not abandon) their
beliefs about how the world works.
The ability to make some sense of
the loss
question ••Why?"

- was

-

to answer the

fundamentally important in coping.

By

bringing some sense or meaning to the
death, these individuals were
able to maintain the conceptual framework
which guided their
approach to life,

in contrast, individuals

sense of the loss, v^o asked themselves

vdio

••Why?"

could not make

but found no answer,

were struggling not only with the actual
loss, but also with the
need to discover anew fundamental principles
by

v^ch

they might

live.

In addition to facilitating our understanding
of grief, the

present study also sheds some light on how change
is brou^t about
in an individual's assumptive world.

Because of a complex

interaction of intrapsychic, interpersonal and external
factors,

the bereavement had profound effects on seme individuals, and
relatively insignificant effects on others.

their beliefs were shattered.

For some individuals,

For others, it seemed that

maintaining their beliefs, i.e. not allowing them to be shattered,

was of such importance that their understanding of the death was
cast vAiolly within the context of their pre-existing conceptual
system.

And for still other individuals, it appeared that they
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caught in a p««ess of
.^otiation betaken
old, salvaging vtot they
oculd fran their

systen.

a^

beliefs

ancj

pre^isting belief

stret*ing the, to fit the
cto^ed reality which they

now faced.
By focusing priinarily on a
certain aspect of the experience
of
bereavement
how the e^ienc^ affects the
fundamental beliefs
v^ich guide an individual's life
this study necessarily ignored

-

-

many other relevant areas of concern.

Additionally, liMtations of

the present study suggest that
caution may be warranted in too
broad an application of the firxiii^s.
For example, the population
studied, narrowly defined in terms of
age and type of loss, may not

be indicative of other, older populations,

with the exception of

two individuals, all the subjects could
be considered as
adolescents at the time of their loss,

it may be that there is

something particular to that age group in
terms of coping with
trauma.
Further, because of the relative homogeneity of
the population

in terms of the type of loss (i.e., the majority
of the deaths were

due to illness, either cancer or cardiac disease)

,

this study

cannot address the important differences between sudden
vs.
expected death.

In terms of an assault on fundamental assumptions,

it is reasonable to assume that a sudden, unejqjected death would

potentially have a greater impact on an individual's beliefs than
one that is anticipated.

Ihe sample population for the present study was more
specifically defined and more rigorously selected than is usual in
studies of bereavement.

Selection of the bereaved population was
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detennined by the recency of
the death

,

the age of the subj ects

the type of death, and the
relationship of the deceased
to the
subject,
the use Of a carefully
Hatched control group
distinguished this sUidy frc the
vast najority of grief-related
resear^ projects (see W.
&

^er,

Str^

stroebe, 1987 for a fuller

discussion Of methodological problems
in bereavement research)
Still, due to the constraints
of the available population,
a

few potentially signf icant factors
went uncontrolled in the
present
study. These factors included the
the gender of the bereaved
individual, the specifc cause of death,
and v^ether the loss was

maternal or paterml.

The literature on bereavement,
although

ambiguous on each of these variables,
nonetheless suggests that

they may be important in determining
patterns of grief.
However, as already discussed, no
gender-related differences

were found in the present study in terms of
grieving response or
assumptive beliefs.

Because of the nature of the study,

enphasizing the conceptual changes accompanying
bereavement rather

than the grieving process itself, it appears that
the sample was
adequately homogenous to test the hypotheses in question.
In terms of future research, the present study opens the
doors

down several different pathways.

First, do the altered beliefs in

meaning associated with bereavement hold any predictive value, in
terms of the course of the grieving process?

At present, a follow-

up study is being undertaken with the 21 bereaved individuals who
participated in the current study, to determine the progression of

their grief over the past year and to reassess their beliefs in
meaning.
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second, is it possible to
disentangle the oa,plex «eb
of
factors that leads sc»e
individuals to ^is^i^
their old beliefs
and forces others to relin^sh
ttem? Given an increas«i

understandi^ of the ass»ptive
v„rlds

*i*

guide people's lives,

this nay be possible i. a
c^aalitative, clinically-orientad
v^icl. examines both the

study

intraf^yAio and interpersonal
worlds of

bereaved indivduals.

And third, the present study
found that an inability to
ascribe meaning to the death was
strongly associated with a

pronounced grief reaction.

Can this datum help construct
a irore

flexible and accurate model for
grief than the stage-type approach
v^ich currently predominates in both
professional and public

thinking?

in keeping with the work of Averill
(1968; Averill &

Nunley, 1988), Parkes (e.g., 1988)
and Wortman and Silver (1987, in
press)
,

the present study suggests that new
directions and

conceptual paradigms are necessary to move
forward in our

understanding of grief.
Examining the changes in the bereaved's
assumptive worlds may

play a key role in attenpting to assess and
understand the major
changes that follow the death of loved one.

After such an

ejqjerience, one can no longer see the world as one
saw it prior to

the loss.

For theoreticians attempting to understanding

bereavement and for clinicians hoping to ameliorate the pain of
the
bereaved, an awareness of the dramatic shifts in how a traumatized

person ascribes meaning to his or her life may help demystify the
complexity and difficulty of bereavement.

Ill

Bereave^snt, lite any tra»a,
tests the liMts of one's
a-^tions, one's entea«^, or^'s
^iUence. By operatic at

that

extr^,

^

^

^ ^^^^

ente^

in day to day life, the
fx^si^iuty arises of leami:^
^th
deeply t«inful and, occasio:«Uy,
profc^y encouraging lessons.
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